Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., Professional Therapy, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., Thomas D. Rosenberg : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc.,
Professional Therapy, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee &
Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C.,
Thomas D. Rosenberg : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark O. Morris; Snell and Wilmer; Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees.
John C. Green; Kim M. Luhn; Green and Luhn; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, No. 940417 (Utah Court of Appeals,
1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6071
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. f/k/a 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah General 
Partnership and LONNIE E. 
PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
Professional Corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah Professional 
Corporation, General Partners, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 940417-CA 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE KNEE & 
SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND ORDER GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION AND AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE 








MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636) 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
JOHN C. GREEN (1242) 
KIM M. LUHN (5105) 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
FILED 
JAN 0 9 1995 
COUftT OF APPEA! 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
SALT LAKE KNEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. f/k/a 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC. 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & SPORTS 
MEDICINE, a Utah General 
Partnership and LONNIE E. 
PAULOS, M.D., P.C., a Utah 
Professional Corporation and 
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., 
P.C., a Utah Professional 
Corporation, General Partners, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
ooOoo 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT SALT LAKE KNEE & 
SPORTS REHABILITATION, INC. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AND ORDER GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION AND AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, BY THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
JOHN C. GREEN (1242) 
KIM M. LUHN (5105) 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636) 
SNELL & WILMER 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-1900 
case wo. y4U4i/-«jA 
District Court No. 910906316CN 
Argument Priority 
Classification 15 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ill 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRANSACTION BY AND BETWEEN THE APPELLEES AND IHC, 
TAKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY, CONSTITUTES A "SALE" AS THAT TERM 
IS DEFINED IN THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES 15 
ARGUMENT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT NOT SUGGESTED BY EITHER 
PARTY. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE FACT THAT THE COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT WAS DIFFERENT 
THAN THE INTERPRETATION PROPOUNDED BY EITHER PARTY 
ESTABLISHES THAT THE CONTRACT IS, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
AMBIGUOUS. THEREFORE, THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 22 
ARGUMENT III 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY 




A. TERMINATION AGREEMENT AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
B. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING - SEPTEMBER 24, 1993 
C. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING - NOVEMBER 15, 1993 
D. TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING - JANUARY 28, 1994 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1992) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1992) 1 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2 
Rule 10(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1992) 11 
CASES CITED 
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) . 2, 29 
Clover v Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991) . 2 
Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980) 16 
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 
787 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1990) 16 
Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1987) 17, 23 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 
737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987) 17 
HCA Health Services v. St. Mark's Charities, 
846 P.2d 476, 484 (Utah App. 1993) 17 
Chambliss/Jenkins Assoc, v. Forster, 
650 P.2d 1315, 1318 (Colo. App. 1982) 17 
Huskie v. Ames Bros. Motor & Supply Co., 
139 Ariz. 396, 678 P.2d 977 (Ariz. App. 1984) 17 
Hueschen v. Stalie, 98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982) . . . . 18 
Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 
768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989) 25 
Wineqar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) . 25, 26, 29 
Sears v. Riemersma 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) 27 
Parks Enterprises Inc. v. New Century Realty Inc., 
652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982) 27 
iii 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal of two orders granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Appellees Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenberg, M.D., P.C., 
and dismissing the Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
Rehabilitation, Inc.'s Complaint for declaratory relief. The 
action involved a dispute between the parties as to their 
respective rights and status under the Termination Agreement and 
Purchase Agreement entered into between them. The Orders were 
entered by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. This 
Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2) (j) (1992). Originally, the Utah Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992) as 
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
However, pursuant to Notice dated July 14, 1994, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting 
and then reaffirming the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
determining that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
Hospitals, Inc. on May 24, 1990 was not a "sale" as defined in 
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement between the parties to 
this action? 
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2. Did the trial court err in basing its ruling on an 
interpretation of the Termination Agreement not propounded by 
either party? In the alternative, did the court's interpretation 
of the Termination Agreement render it ambiguous such that summary 
judgment was inappropriate? 
3. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in 
the face of genuine issues of material fact? 
Because this case was decided on summary judgment, the issues 
are issues of law. Therefore, the trial court's determination is 
accorded no deference by the appellate court but is reviewed for 
correctness. (Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 
1993); Clover v Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 
1991).) Summary judgment is precluded where issues of material 
fact remain unresolved. Finally, in reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, an appellate court must view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. (See Hiqqins 855 P.2d at 233, and Clover, 808 P.2d 
at 1039. ) 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Motion and proceeding thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the 
time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Rehabilitation") filed its Complaint for declaratory 
relief on October 4, 1991 seeking a declaratory judgment that a 
transaction by and between the Appellees and IHC Hospitals, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "IHC") on or about May 24, 1990 
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination 
Agreement and Purchase Agreement by and between the parties to this 
action (hereinafter referred to as the "Termination Agreement"). 
Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, if the transaction was in 
fact a "sale", Rehabilitation is entitled to payment from the 
Appellees in an amount equal to one-third of the purchase price 
attributable to the purchase of good will. (R. 2 - 29.) 
Subsequently, the Appellees filed an Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging that Rehabilitation breached certain non-
competition provisions of the Termination Agreement. The 
Counterclaim was later dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of 
the parties. (R. 143 - 165.) The Order of Dismissal was entered 
by the court on February 16, 1994. (R. 411.) 
The Appellees, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine, Lonnie E. 
Paulos, M.D., P.C. and Thomas D. Rosenberg M.D., P.C. filed their 
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Motion for Summary Judgment on or about June 15, 1993, alleging 
that Rehabilitation could not produce evidence sufficient to avoid 
dismissal of its claims on summary judgment, (R. 168 - 170 and 171 
- 196.) Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment arguing that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
on or about May 24, 1990 was in fact a "sale" as that term is 
defined in the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was 
entitled to judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be 
proven at trial representing one third of the purchase price 
attributable to the purchase of good will. Rehabilitation further 
moved the court for summary judgment dismissing the Appellees' 
Counterclaims with prejudice. (R. 199-225.) 
At the initial hearing on the motions for summary judgment on 
September 24, 1993, the court expressed its opinion that the 
transaction between the Appellees and IHC was in fact a "sale" as 
that term is defined in the Termination Agreement, but the court 
reached this conclusion based on a completely different 
interpretation of the contract than the interpretation propounded 
by the parties. (R. 480-82.) Therefore, the Appellees requested 
and received the opportunity to submit additional written arguments 
relating to the court's interpretation of the contract. (R. 482-
84. ) 
The matter once again came on for hearing on November 15, 1993 
at which time the court reversed its original position and ruled 
that the transaction was in fact not a "sale" as contemplated by 
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the Termination Agreement. Therefore, the court granted the 
Appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
Rehabilitation^ Complaint with prejudice. (R. 494-95.) 
As a result of what Rehabilitation believed was an error in 
law; the apparent inconsistencies in the positions taken by the 
court in each hearing; and based on what appeared to be an 
ambiguity in the contract itself resulting in the different 
interpretations, Rehabilitation filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
on or about November 29, 1993, and it came on regularly for hearing 
on January 28, 1994. (R. 351-53 and 361-96.) The court 
reconsidered its decision but affirmed its previous ruling, and the 
Order was entered on March 14, 1994. (R. 414-16.) Rehabilitation 
filed its Notice of Appeal on or about April 11, 1994. (R. 417-
18. ) 
After the filing of the Docketing Statement, the Appellees 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, arguing that the Motion for 
Reconsideration had not tolled the time within which to file an 
appeal and that therefore the Notice of Appeal was not timely 
filed. By Notice dated June 15, 1994, the Utah Supreme Court 
reserved the Appellees1 Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to 
Rule 10(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. By Notice 
dated July 14, 1994, this case was poured over to the Court of 
Appeals for disposition. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Prior to May 22, 1989, the parties to this action were 
working together to provide medical and physical therapy services 
at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center located at 670 East 3900 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
the "Center") pursuant to the terms of a Professional Services 
Contract and Lease Agreement entered into by the parties in 1987 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Professional Services Contract11.) 
(R. 202, 234 and 238- ) 
2. At all times pertinent hereto, the Appellees, Salt Lake 
City Knee & Sports Medicine (hereinafter sometimes referred to as 
"Medicine") was a Utah general partnership and the Defendants, 
Lonnie E. Paulos, M.D., P.C., and Thomas D. Rosenburg, M.D., P.C., 
were the general partners of Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Paulos" and "Rosenburg".) 
(For brevity, when being referred to as a group, all defendants 
will be referred to as "Appellees".) (R. 202.) 
3. Prior to termination of the Professional Services 
Contract, the parties to this action became involved in 
negotiations with IHC Hospitals, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"IHC") for the purchase of the Center. Negotiations were also 
ongoing with HCA/St. Marks. (R. 202, 234 and 239.) 
4. On or about January 19, 1989, Doug Toole, a principal of 
Rehabilitation, informed Rosenburg and Paulos that he and Greg 
Gardner, another principal of Rehabilitation, were not willing to 
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terminate their business relationship with Holy Cross Hospital in 
order to work exclusively with IHC. Paulos left the room and 
returned with a Notice of Termination dated January 19, 1989, 
terminating the Professional Services Contract . (R. 203 and 239.) 
5. On or about May 22, 1989, the parties entered into a 
Termination Agreement and Purchase Agreement which terminated the 
Professional Services Contract (hereinafter "Termination 
Agreementff) . Attorneys for Appellees drafted the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 203, 234-35, and 239-40.) 
6. At issue in this case are the provisions of paragraph 11 
of the Termination Agreement which states as follows: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians [Appellees herein] sells 
the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation 
shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributed to good will. 'Sale' shall be 
defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center,' all of the equipment 
and other assets located at the Center, the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
(A copy of the Termination Agreement is attached hereto in Addendum 
"A" and is by reference made a part hereof.) (R. 8-15.) 
7. The only other consideration received by Rehabilitation 
for its interest in the Center was the sum of $33,929.00 which 
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Rehabilitation was obligated to pay to certain lien holders to 
remove all encumbrances on the equipment which Rehabilitation was 
selling to the Appellees, and $6,000.00 paid as reimbursement for 
services provided Granite School District. (See Addendum A) (R. 
234 - 35, 239 - 40, and U 7 of the Termination Agreement.) 
8. Approximately one year later, the Appellees entered into 
a series of agreements with IHC on May 24, 1990, for the purchase 
of an interest in the Center located at 670 East 3900 South as well 
as other Centers owned by Appellees located at 359 8th Avenue and 
the part-time clinic in Park City. (Copies of these agreements 
were submitted to the court for in camera review pursuant to a 
Stipulated Protective Order entered by the court. They remain 
sealed on appeal so precise citations to the record are not 
available.) These agreements included, but were not limited to, 
the following: 
a. The Appellees and IHC entered into an Asset Purchase 
Agreement whereby the Appellees purportedly sold to IHC an 
undivided one-half interest in all assets of the three 
facilities. The personal property sold is expressly defined 
in the Agreement and the description expressly includes "good 
will". (See H 1(a) of the Asset Purchase Agreement which was 
submitted for in camera review.) 
In addition to all of the personal property reflected 
above, the Appellees sold to IHC an undivided one-half 
interest in the leases pertaining to the three facilities at 
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issue as well as Appellees' interest in material contracts. 
(See Us 1(b) and (c) of the Asset Purchase Agreement.) The 
purchase price paid by IHC for purchase of this undivided one-
half interest was significant. (See I 2 of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement.) 
b. Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, the Appellees executed a Special Warranty 
Bill of Sale and Assignment whereby Salt Lake City Knee & 
Sports Medicine transferred, assigned and conveyed to IHC the 
assets described above. It also expressly includes good will. 
(See the Special Warranty Bill of Sale and Assignment 
submitted for in camera review.) 
c. Contemporaneously with execution of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement, the Appellees and IHC hospitals entered 
into a Joint Venture Agreement for Sports Medicine West 
wherein each of the parties agreed to contribute to the newly 
created joint venture their 50% undivided interest in the 
"Assets pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement". [sic] The 
Joint Venture Agreement also states it was formed to "develop, 
construct, finance, own and manage the Building and to own, 
manage, market and operate the Businesses". (See H 2.3 of the 
Joint Venture Agreement submitted for in camera review.) The 
reference to the "building" refers to the plans by the joint 
venture to construct a new building wherein the business of 
the two Centers would be conducted. One of the "Businesses" 
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was the Center at 3900 South. Paragraph 9.3.1 of the Joint 
Venture Agreement expressly recognizes that it was formed to 
take advantage of the unique reputations and abilities if 
Appellees Rosenberg and Paulos as orthopedic surgeons and that 
the joint venture was formed to enhance the development and 
preservation of the "good will" within the joint venture. 
(See H 9.3.1.) 
d. Contemporaneously with the execution of all of the 
foregoing, Appellees and IHC executed a Special Warranty Bill 
of Sale and Assignment whereby each transferred, assigned and 
conveyed to Sports Medicine West, their respective undivided 
one-half interests. It expressly lists "good will" as an 
asset being transferred. (See Special Warranty Bill of Sale 
and Assignment submitted for in camera review.) 
e. Similarly, assignments were executed by the parties 
transferring their interests in the leases and material 
contracts, first by and between Salt Lake City Knee & Sports 
Medicine to IHC Hospitals, Inc., and from Salt Lake City Knee 
& Sports Medicine and IHC Hospitals, Inc. to Sports Medicine 
West. (See documents submitted for in camera review.) 
f. Finally, the Appellees entered into a Management 
Agreement with the joint venture whereby they agreed to 
continue to conduct the businesses at two of the facilities 
until such time as the building to be built by the joint 
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venture could be finished. (See documents submitted for in 
camera review.) 
9. Subsequent to the execution of these documents, the joint 
venture continued to do business at the 3900 South Center under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". The name was not changed 
to "Sports Medicine West" until almost one and one-half years later 
and after Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. 
(R. 235 and 241.) 
10. After learning of the transaction between the Appellees 
and IHC, Rehabilitation requested information concerning it. The 
Appellees refused to provide such information on the basis that the 
transaction was not a "sale" as defined by the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 4.) Therefore, on or about October 4, 1991, 
Rehabilitation filed its Complaint for declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1992) seeking, among other 
things, an order declaring as follows: 
a. That a sale of the Center took place on or about the 
24th day of May, 1990 between the Appellees and IHC; and 
b. That the sale was a "sale" within the meaning of the 
provisions of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement 
between the parties and that Rehabilitation is entitled one-
third of any amounts attributable to good will. (R. 6-7.) 
11. Appellees filed an Answer on or about October 30, 1991 
(R. 39) but subsequently, pursuant to Stipulation between the 
parties, filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R. 143-65.) 
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The Counterclaim was subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the 
parties. (R. 356-57 and 411-12.) 
12. On or about June 15, 1993, the Appellees filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss Rehabilitation's claims on 
the basis that Rehabilitation could produce no evidence in support 
of its position that the transaction between the Appellees and IHC 
constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination 
Agreement. (R. 168-96.) 
13. Rehabilitation filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking a declaration that the transaction between the 
Appellees and IHC was in fact a "sale" as that term was defined in 
the Termination Agreement and that Rehabilitation was entitled to 
judgment against the Appellees in an amount to be proven at trial 
representing one-third of the purchase price attributable to the 
purchase of good will. (R. 199-225.) Contemporaneously, 
Rehabilitation submitted the documents executed by the Appellees 
and IHC for in camera review pursuant to the Protective Order dated 
on or about August 17, 1992. (R. 226-28 and 464.) 
14. The parties1 Motions for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly for hearing on September 24, 1993. At the hearing, Judge 
Wilkinson indicated that his interpretation of the contract was 
different than either of the parties had argued. Specifically, the 
court stated: 
Let me indicate this to you, maybe I am the 
one who is out in left field, but I am the 
one, as I read this contract, who had as my 
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immediate interpretation of the contract that 
it was different than what both of you are 
arguing. That's what concerns me. 
When I read the term 'all' that's why I have 
asked you: It says that the sale shall be 
defined as the transfer of or the purchaser 
acquiring and paying consideration for all of 
the following. That does not include 100 
percent of the value of the following, but it 
must include in the sale all of the following 
items, and each one of those items were sold. 
There was not 100 percent but there was 50 
percent; but all of those were sold. 
But it concerns me when neither one of you 
looked at it that way. That's why I say that 
it sure appears to be ambiguous to me. Of 
course the argument has some merit there, but 
I think it may be absolutely correct as far as 
the joint venture joining, and I have reviewed 
all of these documents, but still that's what 
I am looking at. 
(R. 480-81.) 
The court went on to state that, "Well, I would allow parol 
evidence, because I think [the contract] is ambiguous." (R. 482 
Lines 4 and 5.) 
15. As a result of the court's inclination, counsel for the 
Appellees requested a continuance to submit additional legal 
arguments, and the extra time was granted by the court. (R. 482-
83. ) 
16. After submission by the parties of the supplemental legal 
arguments, the matter came on for hearing once again on November 
15, 1993. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court completely 
reversed its position as set forth in the first hearing and stated, 
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"Therefore I feel that the Motion by the Defendants is well taken. 
I would grant their Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 495.) The 
Order of Summary Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice was entered 
on or about December 6, 1993. (R. 358-60.) 
17. Rehabilitation obtained transcripts of both hearings and 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 29, 1993 arguing: 
a. the court had made an error of law in 
considering only the Asset Purchase Agreement and not all 
of the documents executed by IHC and Appellees in 
determining the nature of that transaction; 
b. the fact that the court reached a different 
interpretation of the contract than the parties rendered the 
contract ambiguous and summary judgment was inappropriate; and 
c. that reconsideration was necessary based on the 
apparent inconsistent positions taken by the court in the two 
hearings. (R. 351-53 and 361-65.) 
18. The court agreed to reconsider its decision, and the 
matter came up for hearing on January 28, 1994. The court once 
again ruled in favor of the Appellees. (R. 504.) The order was 
entered on March 14, 1994. (R. 414.) 
19. Rehabilitation filed its Notice of Appeal on or about 
April 11, 1994. (R. 417.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The court erred as a matter of law in granting the 
Appellees1 Motion for Summary Judgment. As a matter of law, the 
transaction between Appellees and IHC consists of all documents 
executed by them on May 24, 1990 and not just the Asset Purchase 
Agreement. As such, the transaction constituted a "sale" as that 
term is defined in the Termination Agreement. 
2. It was an error for the court to base its decision on an 
interpretation of the Termination Agreement which neither party had 
propounded. In the alternative, the fact that the court 
interpreted the contract differently than either party establishes 
that it is ambiguous, and summary judgment was therefore 
inappropriate. 
3. Genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. 
This Court should reverse the lower court's order and either 
enter its own granting Rehabilitation's motion for partial summary 
judgment or remand the entire case for trial on all issues. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRANSACTION BY AND BETWEEN THE APPELLEES AND IHC, 
TAKEN IN ITS ENTIRETY, CONSTITUTES A "SALE" AS THAT TERM 
IS DEFINED IN THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
party is entitled to summary judgment where the "pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Further, issues of contract 
interpretation which do not require consideration of extrinsic 
evidence are issues of law. (See Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 
(Utah 1980) and Hardy v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 787 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1990).) 
In this case, the lower court entered its order dismissing 
Rehabilitation's Complaint on the basis that the transaction by and 
between the Appellees and IHC did not qualify as a "sale" as that 
term is defined in the Termination Agreement between the parties. 
However, in making this ruling, the court looked only to the Asset 
Purchase Agreement between Appellees and IHC to determine the 
nature of the transaction. This was an error of law. Instead, all 
of the documents executed by Appellees and IHC must be construed 
together in determining whether there has been a "sale" of the 
Center. Properly considering all of these documents, there clearly 
has been a "sale" as a matter of law, thus entitling Rehabilitation 
to a judgment for a portion of the purchase price attributable to 
the purchase of good will. 
While the Asset Purchase Agreement does in fact purport to 
transfer only one-half of the Center to IHC, contemporaneously with 
the execution of the Asset Purchase Agreement on May 24, 1990, the 
Appellees and IHC also entered into no less than eighteen other 
agreements, bills of sale, assumptions, leases and re-leases which 
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together constitute the transaction between them. Because the 
documents are interrelated and were contemporaneously executed, it 
is necessary to analyze all of them together in order to determine 
whether or not there has been a sale under the Termination 
Agreement. As outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1987): 
Contracts should be construed so as to give 
effect to the parties1 intentions, and such 
intent should be determined, if possible, by 
examining the written agreement executed by 
the parties. When agreements are executed 
"substantially contemporaneously and are 
clearly interrelated, they must be construed 
as a whole and harmonized, if possible.' 
Id. at 1344. (quoting Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987).) (See also HCA Health Services v. St. Mark's 
Charities, 846 P.2d 476, 484 (Utah App. 1993) wherein this Court 
relies on the Verhoef case and states that this principle of law is 
"well-settled". In HCA Health Services, this court also cites with 
favor the case of Chambliss/Jenkins Assoc, v. Forster, 650 P.2d 
1315, 1318 (Colo. App. 1982) wherein the Colorado Court of Appeals 
states, "When an agreement between parties is contained in more 
than one instrument, those instruments must be construed together 
as though they comprised a single document.") In addition, in 
construing the documents which constitute the transaction at issue, 
the court must look to the substance of the documents, rather than 
to their form. (See Huskie v. Ames Bros. Motor & Supply Co., 139 
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Ariz. 396, 678 P.2d 977 (Ariz. App. 1984) and Hueschen v. Stalie, 
98 N.M. 696, 652 P.2d 246 (1982).) 
Beginning first with the Termination Agreement, the Appellees 
paid to Rehabilitation the total amount of $39,929.00 for 
Rehabilitation's interest in the Center. Of this amount, 
$33,929.00 was then paid by Rehabilitation pursuant to paragraph 7 
of the Termination Agreement to satisfy outstanding liens and 
encumbrances on the equipment sold to Appellees. The remaining 
$6,000 was paid to Rehabilitation as reimbursement for services 
provided to Granite School District. Rehabilitation received no 
other compensation for its interest in the Center. 
Instead, pursuant to paragraph 11, the Appellees are required 
to pay an amount to Rehabilitation should the Appellees sell the 
Center to any third party within a period of two years. The amount 
to be paid is one-third of the portion of any purchase price which 
is attributable to the purchase of good will. It is clear from 
this language that the parties recognized that the Center did in 
fact have good will as an asset and that Rehabilitation had 
contributed to the acquisition of this good will. The language of 
the paragraph is also consistent with the fact that the parties had 
been negotiating with IHC and with St. Mark's for the sale of the 
entire Center. 
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement goes on to define a 
"sale" for purposes of the agreement and requires that a purchaser 
acquire and pay consideration for all of an enumerated list of 
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assets including the lease, the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center", the equipment and other assets of the Center, patients, 
and accounts receivable. It also requires a purchaser to assume 
complete operational control of the business of the Center at the 
same location. Specifically, paragraph 11 states: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians [Appellees herein] sells 
the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation 
shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributed to good will. 'Sale* shall be 
defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center,f all of the equipment 
and other assets located at the Center, the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
(See Addendum A) 
Almost exactly one year later on May 24, 1990, the Appellees 
and IHC executed a myriad of documents which resulted in the 
ownership of the Center by an entirely new entity, a joint venture 
known as "Sports Medicine West". The joint venture continued to 
operate the Center at the 3900 South location for approximately the 
next year and a half under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center". The transaction was therefore a "sale" under paragraph 11 
of the Termination Agreement. 
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Turning to the specific documents which constitute the 
transaction between Appellees and IHC, on May 24, 1990, the 
Appellees and IHC entered into the Asset Purchase Agreement upon 
which Appellees now seek to rely. It states that IHC is purchasing 
an undivided one-half interest in the assets located at the 3900 
South Center, as well as an undivided one-half interest in the 
assets owned by the Appellees at the Center located at 359 8th 
Avenue and the part-time medical clinic located at the Park City 
Resort. Despite Appellees1 argument that none of the purchase 
price is attributable to good will, paragraph 1(a) of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement expressly states that good will is one of the 
assets being transferred. The purchase price itself supports a 
conclusion that IHC did in fact pay Appellees for an interest in 
good will. The accompanying Special Warranty Bill of Sale and 
Assignment executed on May 24, 1990 also expressly lists good will. 
Contemporaneously with the execution of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and Special Warranty Bill of Sale on May 24, 1990, IHC 
and the Appellees entered into a Joint Venture Agreement for Sports 
Medicine West wherein the joint venture was formed and each party 
contributed their 50% undivided interest in all of the assets 
described in the Asset Purchase Agreement. To complete the 
transfer, each party executed a Special Warranty Bill of Sale and 
Assignment which once again specifically included good will. Other 
documents also executed on May 24, 1990 transferred the Appellees' 
interest in certain leases and the Appellees1 interest in material 
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contracts to Sports Medicine West. The joint venture agreement 
itself at paragraph 9.3.1 recognizes the value to the joint venture 
of the development and preservation of the good will associated 
with the Appellees. 
At this point in time, after execution of all of these 
documents by Appellees on May 24, 1990, Salt Lake Knee & Sports 
Medicine was divested of all of its right, title and interest in 
and to all of the assets of the Center located at 3900 South, 
including but not limited to the good will associated with the 
Center. In return, the Appellees received a substantial sum of 
cash and a 50% ownership in Sports Medicine West. 
Contemporaneously with execution of all of the sale documents, 
the Appellees entered into a Management Agreement with Sports 
Medicine West as owner which required the Appellees to operate the 
facility at 3900 South in the same manner as it had been operated 
prior to transfer to the joint venture until such time as Sports 
Medicine West could complete construction of the new building to 
house the Appellees1 practice. Pursuant to the Agreement, Sports 
Medicine West continued to operate the Center at 3900 South through 
the Appellees under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" for 
almost a year and a half until sometime after October, 1991. The 
joint venture changed the name of the Center to "Sports Medicine 
West" only after Rehabilitation filed this law suit. 
If the transaction is taken in its entirety, it is clear that 
Medicine, Paulos and Rosenberg did in fact sell the Center as 
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contemplated by the parties to the Termination Agreement. After 
completion of all of the interrelated documents executed by the 
Appellees and IHC on May 24, 1990, the entire Center was owned by 
the joint venture, Sports Medicine West, and the joint venture 
continued to operate as Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center for 
another year and a half. As such, all of the requirements of 
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement have been satisfied and 
Rehabilitation is entitled to an amount equal to one-third of the 
purchase price attributable to good will. 
Therefore, in considering only the Asset Purchase Agreement in 
determining whether or not there had been a "sale", the Court erred 
as a matter of law. This Court should reverse the lower court's 
order and enter its own order granting Rehabilitation's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and declaring that there has in fact been 
a "sale" as that term is defined in the Termination Agreement. 
Then, this case must be remanded for a determination as to the 
amount to which Rehabilitation is entitled pursuant to the 
Termination Agreement. In the alternative, the lower court's order 
should be reversed with the entire issue remanded to the trial 
court for a full trial on all issues. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT NOT SUGGESTED 
BY EITHER PARTY. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE FACT 
THAT THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
TERMINATION AGREEMENT WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE 
INTERPRETATION PROPOUNDED BY EITHER PARTY 
ESTABLISHES THAT THE CONTRACT IS, AS A MATTER 
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OF LAW, AMBIGUOUS. THEREFORE, THERE ARE 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
The initial issue upon which the parties focused on summary 
judgment was whether or not the transaction by and between the 
Appellees and IHC was defined by the language of the singular Asset 
Purchase Agreement or whether all of the documents executed 
contemporaneously with the Asset Purchase Agreement constituted the 
transaction. The parties basically agreed on the interpretation of 
paragraph 11 which states: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if 
within two (2) years from the date of this 
Agreement, Physicians [Appellees herein] sells 
the Center to any third party, Rehabilitation 
shall be entitled to one-third (1/3) of that 
portion of the purchase price which is 
attributed to good will. 'Sale1 shall be 
defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: The Center's lease on the Leased 
Premises, ownership of the name 'Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center,' all of the equipment 
and other assets located at the Center, the 
Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete 
operational control of the business of the 
Center and continues operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
If the Asset Purchase Agreement standing alone constitutes the 
transaction, then the Appellees would prevail because Appellees 
sold only 50% of the assets to IHC and not "all" as required by 
paragraph 11. If, however, as required by the Utah Supreme Court 
in the case of Verhoef v. Aston, supra, all documents are 
considered together, then Rehabilitation must prevail because, at 
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the conclusion of the transaction, a new entity, Sports Medicine 
West owned and controlled 100% of the items listed in paragraph 11. 
The focus of the argument quickly shifted though when the 
court disagreed with the parties as to the meaning of paragraph 11. 
Under the court's interpretation, some portion of all of the items 
listed in paragraph 11 needed to be sold in order to trigger the 
obligation at issue. In the courtfs mind, the word "all" related 
to the category of the item and not the percentage of what was 
sold. At this point, and under this interpretation, the court 
believed that Rehabilitation would have been entitled to prevail 
regardless of whether the court considered the Asset Purchase 
Agreement alone, or whether the court considered all of the 
documents which were executed contemporaneously. 
The court itself expressed concern that since neither of the 
parties had interpreted the contract in the same manner as the 
court, it may be ambiguous. Specifically, the court stated: 
Let me indicate this to you, maybe I am the 
one who is out in left field, but I am the 
one, as I read this contract, who had as my 
immediate interpretation of the contract that 
it was different than what both of you are 
arguing. That's what concerns me. 
When I read the term 'all' that's why I have 
asked you: It says that the sale shall be 
defined as the transfer of or the purchaser 
acquiring and paying consideration for all of 
the following. That does not include 100 
percent of the value of the following, but it 
must include in the sale all of the following 
items, and each one of those items were sold. 
There was not 100 percent but there was 50 
percent; but all of those were sold. 
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But it concerns me when neither one of you 
looked at it that way. That's why I say that 
it sure appears to be ambiguous to me. Of 
course the argument has some merit there, but 
I think it may be absolutely correct as far as 
the joint venture joining, and I have reviewed 
all of these documents, but still that's what 
I am looking at. 
(R. 480-81.) (Emphasis added.) (See Addendum B) 
The Appellees were obviously concerned with the court's 
interpretation, and requested an opportunity to submit additional 
written arguments. When the matter once again came on for hearing, 
the court apparently no longer believed the contract was ambiguous. 
Still using its own interpretation which had previously favored 
Rehabilitation, the court granted the Appellees' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have defined what 
it means for a contract to be ambiguous. This Court addressed the 
question in Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 
(Utah App. 1989) and stated: 
Language may be ambiguous if 'the words used 
to express the meaning and intention of the 
parties are insufficient in a sense that the 
contract may be understood to reach two or 
more plausible meanings.' Once the trial 
court makes the determination that a contract 
is ambiguous, 'because of the uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other 
facial deficiencies, parol evidence is 
admissible to explain the parties' intent.' 
Id. at 977-78. (Citations omitted.) 
25 
Likewise, in the case of Wineqar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 
(Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A contract provision is ambiguous if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meaning 
of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.1 Whether ambiguity exists in a 
contract is a question of law. 
Id. at 108. (citations omitted.) In Wineqar, the Utah Supreme 
Court went on to point out that, ffA motion for summary judgment may 
not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity 
exists and there is a factual issue as to what the parties 
intended.'1 Id. 
Although these cases are not directly on point with the issue 
before this court in this case, they are instructive. 
Specifically, until the court expressed its interpretation of the 
contract, neither party believed it to be ambiguous. Instead, as 
outlined above, their focus was on what constituted the transaction 
between the Appellees and IHC. However, the court, by its use of 
a completely different interpretation, created the ambiguity. At 
most, the court should not have imposed its interpretation on the 
parties. At the very least, since the court believed its 
interpretation was plausible, the language of the contract is 
clearly ambiguous; and the court should have heard parol evidence 
on the intent of the parties before finally deciding the issues. 
Either way, the court committed reversible error. 
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Further, the court failed to take into account that the 
Termination Agreement was drafted by attorneys for the Appellees, 
and therefore, must be construed against them. (See Sears v. 
Riemersma 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982) and Parks Enterprises Inc. v. 
New Century Realty Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982).) 
Turning to the substance of the court's interpretation and the 
court's ultimate ruling after the second hearing, Rehabilitation 
believes it is less than plausible. Specifically, the relevant 
provision of the contract states as follows: 
'Sale' shall be defined as a transfer wherein 
the purchaser acquires and pays consideration 
for all of the following: The Center's Lease 
on the leased premises, ownership of the name 
'Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center', all of the 
equipment and other assets located at the 
Center, the Center's patients and accounts 
receivable, and whereby the purchaser assumes 
complete operational control of the business 
of the Center and continues operating under 
the same name at the same location. 
(Emphasis added.) (See the Management Agreement submitted for in 
camera review.) 
It is the use of the second "all" upon which the court's 
decision rested. The court believed that in order to trigger the 
provisions of paragraph 11 the purchaser had to acquire: 
1. Some percentage (but not all) of the Center's Lease; 
2. Some percentage (but not all) of the ownership of the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center"; 
3. All of the equipment and other assets located at the 
Center; 
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4. Some (but not all) of the Centerfs patients and accounts 
receivable; 
5. Complete operational control; and 
6. The purchaser must continue operating under the same name 
at the same location. 
This hodgepodge of items which includes all equipment and 
other assets, but only a portion of each and every other item is 
simply non-sensical and could not possibly have been the intent of 
the parties. Even if the court's interpretation was plausible, it 
was inappropriate for the court to base its decision on an 
interpretation of the Termination Agreement that was not offered by 
either party. This is especially true in this case because the 
parties themselves basically agreed as to the interpretation of 
paragraph 11, and this interpretation should not have been ignored 
as it represents the intent of the parties. (However, it is 
important to note that had the court considered all of the 
documents as required by law, Rehabilitation would have prevailed 
even under the court's interpretation of the contract.) 
At the very least, the court was correct in commenting in the 
first instance that its interpretation created an ambiguity in the 
contract entitling the parties to submit parol evidence as to their 
intent. Therefore, rather than grant summary judgment based on its 
unique interpretation, the court should have denied the motions for 
summary judgment and proceeded to trial. 
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Based on the foregoing, and in the words of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Wineqar, summary judgment was simply not appropriate. 
Therefore this Court should reverse the lower court's orders and 
either grant Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment or remand 
the issues for trial. 
ARGUMENT III 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT INAPPROPRIATE. 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is appropriate only where "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." In addition, on appeal, the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. (See Hiqqins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).) Applying 
these principles to the facts of this case, it was inappropriate 
for the court to enter summary judgment. 
As outlined in the first argument of this brief, 
Rehabilitation believes that, as a matter of law, the transaction 
between the Appellees and IHC must be defined by an analysis of all 
of the documents executed by those parties on May 24, 1990. 
However, at the very least, the issue of the nature of the 
transaction is a factual issue. Rehabilitation should have been 
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allowed to present evidence relating to the negotiations and the 
ultimate outcome of the IHC transaction. 
However, even under the court's interpretation of the 
Termination Agreement, there were two disputed issues of fact which 
should have precluded the court from granting summary judgment. 
The first issue is whether or not Sports Medicine West assumed 
complete operational control of the Center, and the second issue is 
whether the joint venture continued to operate the Center under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center". Appellees argued that the 
joint venture did not assume complete operational control because 
Appellees themselves continued to operate the Center. 
Rehabilitation disagreed. One of the documents signed on May 24, 
1990 was a Management Agreement by and between Sports Medicine West 
as "Owner" and Salt Lake Knee & Sports Medicine as "Agent". The 
recitals state as follows: 
A. Owner is operating a rehabilitation business at 
two locations in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Business"). 
B. Agent has substantial experience and expertise 
in the planning, development, promotion and management of 
rehabilitation businesses, and has been engaged in the 
development, ownership and operation of the Business, all 
of which factors may be utilized to benefit the 
operations of the Business. 
C. Agent is desirous of entering into a management 
arrangement pursuant to which Agent would undertake the 
direction, supervision and performance of day-to-day 
management and business development activities of the 
Business, the implementation of management and financial 
systems and the recommendation and implementation of 
plans, budgets and other managements tools, under the 
day-to-day direction of the Owner, in consideration for 
which Agent would be paid a management fee. 
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D. Owner is willing to engage Agent to undertake 
those activities on behalf of Owner on certain terms and 
conditions set forth in the balance of this Management 
Agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) (See Management Agreement submitted for in 
camera review.) 
It is clear from the plain and ordinary meaning of this 
language that Sports Medicine West had assumed complete operational 
control, and Medicine was relegated to an agency status. 
Turning next to the second disputed issue, that of whether or 
not the Center continued to operate at the same location under the 
name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center", it was directly in 
dispute. Rehabilitation submitted evidence by way of the 
Affidavits of Greg Gardner and Doug Toole that in fact the Center 
did continue to operate at the same location under the same name 
until after Rehabilitation filed this law suit in October of 1991. 
(R. 235 and R. 241.) The Appellees denied this allegation and 
submitted the Affidavit of Gene Oaks. At paragraph 5, Mr. Oaks 
states that the name was changed approximately one year before 
Rehabilitation filed its law suit in October of 1991. (R. 272-73.) 
Because both of these issues are central to the definition of 
a "sale" as that term is defined in paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement, it was inappropriate for the court to grant summary 
judgment. Given these genuine issues of material fact, this Court 




The lower court erred as a mater of law in looking only to the 
Asset Purchase Agreement and failing to consider all of the 
documents executed by the Appellees and IHC on May 24, 1990 in 
determining the nature of that transaction. Had the court 
correctly considered all of the documents, it would have been clear 
as a matter of law that there had, been a "sale" as that term is 
defined in the Termination Agreement between the parties to this 
action. The court should have granted Rehabilitation's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and the parties should have been allowed to 
proceed to trial to determine the amount to which Rehabilitation is 
entitled. 
In addition, the court committed error by basing its ruling on 
an interpretation of the Termination Agreement not propounded by 
either party. (Although had the court properly considered all the 
documents by and between IHC and the Appellees, Rehabilitation 
would have prevailed under the court's interpretation as well.) At 
the very least, the court's interpretation created an ambiguity 
entitling the parties to submit parol evidence as to their intent. 
This ambiguity, together with other genuine issues of material fact 
should have prevented the court from entering summary judgment. 
This court should reverse the lower court's orders and grant 
Rehabilitation's Motion for Summary Judgment. The case must then 
be remanded for a determination of the amount to which 
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Rehabilitation is entitled. In the alternative, this court should 
reverse the lower court's orders and remand all issues for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of January, 1995. 
GREEN & LUHN, P.C. 
Attorneys laintiff/Appellant 
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Mark 0. Morris, Esq. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
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J • Termination, Tn« Agreement is hereby 
terminated effective April 19, 1909, subject to the 
previsions of paragraph 13 of that Agreement, which by its 
terras survives? the termination of the Agreement. 
2. vacation of Premises. Rehabilitation shall 
vacate the premises at. C70 East 3 900 South, Salt Lake City/ 
Utah, (htsrt-iiaaFter referred to as the "Leased Premises") 
which is the subject of the Agreement, no later than Sunday 
April 23, 1939 at 12:00 Midnight. 
3. Pelsasc of C1 •-».im:i . The parties hereto hereby 
release each other and their predecessors in interest and 
principals for all claims itriri liability to each other 
arising out of the Ayrtse^ e-nt or the parties' performance 
thereunder, except Zoc any claims arising out of paragraph 
11 ar.d paragraph 13 of the Agreement, which claims are 
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Rehabilitacion by Physicians in cash at the time of Closing, 
subject Lo che provision* of paragraph 7 below, 
6• Payment of Coats in Connection with Granite 
School District: High School sports Medicine program. In 
addition LO the purchase price for the Equipment, Physicians 
shall pay to Rehabilitation at Closing, subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 7 b^iow, the sum of Six Thousand 
Dollars ($5,000.00), which represents reimbursement to 
rehabilitation for costs incurred by Rehabilitation in 
connection with Rehabilitation's participation In Medicine's 
Granite School District High School Sports Medicine Program* 
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security inT.er*st -held by Capital City Bank (as successor xn 
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» •'• c*yainst th<? Eqaipn'ecvt. I t is a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t the 
w i l l together proceed d i r e c t l y from the Leased 
i JS to the Wast. One Bank on the day of c los ing t o maxe 
c e r t a i n t h a t the above-descr ibed procedure i s accomplished. 
:
 ». 4 . - ' 
3. Clcsinq. Closing shall occur at the Leased;, 
* • i±z\ 
r-xomicco at a tisrte tnuv.ua 1.1 y agreeable to the purticor but;/in 
;ic event lat*r than Friday, Way 5, 1989 at 5:00 p.m. Atg; 
closing, Physicians oc the if representative shall take a^  
physical inventory oi! th« Equipment. At closing, 
Rshaoilitatior. shall provide to Physicians written "• 
verification froxn Capital City Bank (as successor in 
interest to Union Bank) that any liens or security interests 
that entity may have against the Equipment and against;-an#' 
equipment Phyr.icianc oi its partners may havo previously 
poichdi-ed crom Rehabilitation (including without limitataarij 
the physical th^rany equipment located at 359.8th Avenue 
which was purchased in approximately September of 1987).have 
been t^rminaUsd. Upon veriCicaticn of the-presence of.each 
item of Equipment, rind upon receipt of the verification 
requited ab.wo, p^y^icians? f,nall deliver to Rehabilitation ""a, 
checJ: ma-ie pay-dole to Rehabilitation and West One Bank for** 
the en~ire parcnase pri-^ of t.he Equipment together with Jthe 
payment referred to in paragraph 6 above. 
9. Warranties. Rehabilitation warrants that it~V 
owns the Equipment, free from any liens or encumbrances* 
except those referred in in paragraph 7 above, and has the~V" 
right to sell the sar.,*j. Rehabilitation further warrants 
that alj of Lhe Equipment shall at the time of Closing be in 
good working condition and free from defects. 
10. Com Tosfi Rpoarding Murray High School, 
Physicians and Rehaoi 11 t At J on. acknowledge that pursuant to 
paragraph IS of the Ag/^m^nt, the right to be involved in a 
i' 
sports Medicine rurjram -it high schools which became a part;. 
of Medicine's High School [-ports Medicine Program after the"" 
effective dare of tn* Ayre^eiit would oe determined by ak*?^* 
toss of lh« coj ru Th* jat'ti-as agree that Murray High School1 
fits iuto ^na' category, ind the parties therefore agree' 
that at closing a coin toss shall be conducted between 
Physicians and ^ua1:!! itation. with tne winner of that coiTfi 
toss naving ths sol^ ri.gi*t »n conduct a Sports Medicines^! 
Program a4: Murray High School, free from competition from* 
the loset of that co * »SA* _ ^ 
11. ?MLctM3f of Center, It is agreed that ifn' 
within tw^ (?) '-pflcs fivm • Ke dat^ of this Agreement, 
- 6 -
Physicians s e l l s the Center to any t h i r d party f 
Rehabi l i ta t ion shal l bc-i e n t i t l e d to one - th i rd (1/3). of" thatj 
portion of the purchase pr ice which i s a t t r i bu t ed to good* 
• • *?«r,vc 
w i l l . "Sale" shall be defined as a t r an s f e r wherein the*) 
f \ -+\ 
purchaser acquires and pays considera t ion feu a l l of the' 
following; The Center fa lease on the Leased Premisesr 
ownership of the naine "Sale Lake Sports Medicine Center,.* 
/ a l l ) of the equipment and ether a s se t s located at the Center^ 
the Center ' s patient:* and accounts rece ivab le , and wherebyl 
the purchaser assumes complete opera t iona l control of the" 
business aC the Center and continues operating under the 
same name at the same locat ion, 
12. Binding Agreement, This Agreement shal l be"' 
biriding on and inure to Lr.e benefi t of the p a r t i e s , and 
the i r h e i r s , successors, and ass igns . 
13- Timn. Time is of the essence of th is 
Agreement. 
14. Attorneys Pees. Should any party default''/:in; 
or breach any oi: the covenants or agreements contained: 
, >- t^jii 
herein, the defaulting or breaching party shall pay*.aiX. 
costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees 
- 7 -
w h i c h may a c c r u e f rom e n f o r c i n g t h i s A g r e e m e n t , o r i n ' 
p u r s u i n g a n y remedy p r o v i d e d h e r e u n d e r , or by a p p l i c a b l e 
l a w . 
SALT LAKE KNEE 6 SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC. " \ 
By _ - . 
I t s
 -da^s&ZZ .Hft,.^::.,* 
SALT LAKE CITY KNEE & S P O R T S £ 
MEDICINE, a Utah P a r t n e r s h i p s -
By LONNIE E. PAULOS, M.D . \ jncV -* 
a P ro fe s s iona l Co^o ra t ion , ' ^v? ' 
General Pa£<m*r/ '> / / ^iS' .h j ' 
Paul o s , P r e s * « ^ £ 
By THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., P . C W j ^ ' 
a P rofess iona l Corporat ion, r ^ ^ ^ C v " 
General Par tner \* /#vfV*' 
Thcrnas D. 'Rosenberg, M.^T«^s&^-2: 
Exhibit "A" 
CAL THERAPY EQUIPMENT 
6CUTH CLINIC 
KENT AT 7OX 
LEG CURL 
SMITH MACHINE (SQUAT; 






SCOTSMAN ICE HACHI2T2 
PITRON CYCLE 
MEDMETRIC KT-100D 
EXAM TABLES (6 8 $230 £A. ) 
CHATTANOGA INTELECT STIM 




PMENT $ 30* 
LEG EXTENSION 







XE EQUIPMENT § 70* 
*. IS07SC, PHONES (4 g 270) 
'•; ISM WH22LWRITER 
k AMANO TIME CLOCK 
{• TYPEWRITER STAND 
FILE CABINETS (2 $ 480) 
?00T STOOL 
WAITING ROOM SOFA (1/2) 
* LUNCHROOM TABLE 
LUNCHROOM CHAIRS - 4 
MICROWAVE 
CHAIRS (3 £ 154) 
DESK 
AL. 






















































































IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL J^^ 3' D l S t r i C t 
IN AND FOR SALT LAi-E COUNTY, STATE OF U T A O E C 0 3 1993 
SALT LAP E \ NEE & SPORTS 
REHABILITATION, INC., F^A 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, INC., 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SALT LA^E CITY I NEE b SPORTS 
MEDICINE, A UTAH GENERAL 
PARTNERSHIP, AND LONNIE C. 
PAULQO, M.D., P.C., A UTAH 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, 
AND THOMAS P. ROSENBERG, 





SALT LAKE COUNTY 
•JZ 
BIE'QBII5'_S_IRANSCR1PT_0F 
HEARING: SUNDRY MOTIONS 
Deputy Clerk 
ORIGINAL 
CIVIL NO. «?i0906316 CN 
HON. HOMER F. WILI INSON 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 24TH_I}AY..0F 
§EPIEMBERJL_.t923, CONTINUING IN THE 10:00 A.M. LAW AND MOTION 
CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME UN FOR HEARING IN 
COURTROOM NO. 502 OF I HE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
uUSTICC, 240 EAST 400 SOUTH, SALT LAI- E CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE HOMER V. WILI- INSON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
JQHN_C^.j2REENi_ATT0RNEY-AT=LAW, AND LlH-fU 
LyHNj.ATIDRNEYjieT-LriW, LJAPIC, GRAY, STEGALL ?J GREEN, 48 
MARHZT STREET, THIRD FLOOR, SALT LAI- E CITY, UTAH S4101 
00465 
1 TELEPHONE 532-6996 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
2 MARK_Qi_MORRISA_ATIQRNEY-AIrLAW1 SNELL & 
3 WILMER, 111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 


















1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
2 IN OPEN COURT:) 
3 THE COURT: GOING BACf TO THE HEAD OF THE 













JOHN GREEN AND I- IM LUHN FOR THE 
MARK MORRIS ON BEHALF OF THE 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, HOW LONG ARE YOU GOING TO 
1 NEED ON THIS"1 
2 MR. MORRIS: WE'LL NEED ABOUT TEN MINUTES TO 
3 ARGUE OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
4 MR. GREEN: TEN TO TWENTY MINUTES, YOUR HONOR. 
5 THE COURT: THAT'S A BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TEN 
6 AND TWENTY, COUNSEL. 
7 MR. GREEN: FIFTEEN, THEN, YOUR HONORS 
3 THE COURT: ]'M TRYING TO ll-IINf: I HAVE THREE 
9 ARGUMENTS—UIAY. GO AHEAD. ] HAVE READ YOUR MEMORANDA. I'VE 
0 LOOI- ED OVER YOUR MATERIAL AND SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON THIS. 
1 MR. MORRIS: I MAY NEED LESS THAN TEN MINUTES. 
2 MY NAME IS MARf MORRIS AND ! REPRESENT THE DEFENDANTS HERF. 
7 IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, 3 WON'T ARGUE OUR OBJECTION TO THEIR 
4 AFFIDAVIT AND EVIDENTIARY TOINTS. I DON'T THINI- IT'S 
5 NECESSARY HERE. THEY KE OF RECORD. 
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THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS CASE, SALT LAKE CITY 
REHABILITATION, AND MY CLIENTS SALT LAKE CITY MEDICINE, AT ONE 
TIME WORKED TOGETHER, HAD A NICE LITTLE MEDICAL PRACTICE. 
IN MAY OF '89, THEY ENTERED INTO A TERMINATION 
AGREEMENT. 
ELEVEN OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT SAYS THAT 
IF THIS CENTER, AND AFTER THEY SPLIT—I MIGHT SAY MY CLIENTS, 
MEDICINE, HAD CERTAIN ASSETS. THOSE ASSETS INCLUDED A LEASE, 
THE NAMED EQUIPMENT, PATIENTS, AND COMPLETE OPERATIONAL 
CONTROL. 
REHABILITATION LEFT THE SCENE. MY CLIENTS WERE 
LEFT WITH THIS PIE, IF YOU WILL. 
PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
STATES THAT IF THIS PIE IS SOLD BY MEDICINE FOR CONSIDERATION 
TO A THIRD PARTY, THEN REHABILITATION WILL BE ENTITLED TO ONE-
THIRD OF THE PURCHASE PRICE THAT IS DEVOTED TO ANY GOOD WILL 
THAT THIS PIE HAD, THIS MEDICAL CENTER HAD. 
NOW THEIR CLAIM IN THIS LAWSUIT IS THAT THIS 
PIE WAS SOLD AS DEFINED IN THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT. THAT IS 
A FACTUAL ISSUE HERE TODAY. IT'S WHAT THEY CAN'T PROVE. 
NOW THIS IS—BRIEFLY, TO REMIND THE COURT, IN 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, UNDER THE CELDTEX CASE, ADOPTED BY THE COURT 
OF APPEALS, AND THE ROBINSON AND GEI.GY DECISIONS, WE NEED NOT 
PROVE THAT THIS NEGATIVE OCCURRED, THAT THIS SALE DID NOT 
OCCUR. THE BURDEN IS ON THE PLAINTIFF. 
4 
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ONCE WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE COURT THAT THEY 
HAVE NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM, THAT THIS COMPLETE 
SALE OF THIS WHOLE PIE TOOK PLACE, THE BURDEN IS ON THEM TO 
COME FORWARD IN RESPONSE TO THIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND PROVE THAT THIS PIE WAS SOLD AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH NO. 
11 OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT. 
THEY HAVE NOT DONE THAT, YOUR HONOR. SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE. 
WHAT THEY HAVE COME FORWARD WITH, YOUR HONOR, 
ARE A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS THAT MY CLIENTS ENTERED INTO, AND 
THAT'S IN MAY OF '09. 
DOWN HERE IN MAY OF '90, MY CLIENTS, MEDICINE, 
AND IHC ENTERED INTO A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS. THE FIRST PART 
OF THAT AGREEMENT WAS THIS PIE WAS SPLIT. THERE IS NO DISPUTE 
ABOUT WHAT THE DOCUMENTS SAY. HALF OF THIS PIE CAME DOWN HERE 
AND THERE WAS CONSIDERATION PAID FOR IT TO IHC. 
MEDICINE RETAINED COMPLETE OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, 
EVERYTHING FROM 50 PERCENT OF THIS PIE. 
NOW PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT 
IS UNEQUIVOCAL. IT'S CLEAR. IT SAYS THAT A SALE THAT WILL 
MAtE THIS CLAUSE OPERANT MUST BE "ALL." IN THIS TRANSACTION 
DOWN TO IHC, ONE HALF, MOT ALL, BUT HALF OF THESE ASSETS WERE 
SOLD TO IHC. MEDICINE RETAINED OWNERSHIP DOWN TO HERE. 
THE NEXT THING THEY DID WAS THEY ENTERED INTO A 
JOINT VENTURE RELATIONSHIP WHERE IHC CONTRIBUTED TO THAT JOINT 
5 
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VENTURE NO MONEY, BUT JUST SAID, "HERE ARE THESE ASSETS WE ARE 
CONTRIBUTING HERE TO THE JOINT VENTURE," AND MEDICINE 
CONTRIBUTED ITS ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE THESE THINGS TO THE 
JOINT VENTURE. 
NOW WHAT'S LEFT IS A JOINT VENTURE WITH IHC AND 
MEDICINE, AND THIS JOINT VENTURE HAS MANY MORE ASSETS THAT THE 
PARTIES HAVE ADDED TO IT AND CONTRIBUTED TO IT. 
BUT THE PLAIN FACT IS, YOUR HONOR, THIS PIE WAS 
NEVER SOLD AS A UNIT, AND MY CLIENT NEVER SOLD MORE THAN HALF 
OF WHAT THEY HAD BEFORE. 
WHAT REHABILITATION WANTS THE COURT TO DO IS 
SOMEHOW LOOI AT THIS TRANSACTION IN MAY OF '90 AND SAY, "LOOK 
AT ALL THE AGREEMENTS, EVERYTHING THAT HAPPENED," AND RULE 
THAT THIS EVENT, THIS SALE OF ALL THESE ASSETS, TOCtt PLACE. 
THAT DID NOT OCCUR, YOUR HONOR. IF A SALE OF 
ALL OF THESE ASSETS TOOI- PLACE, AND FOR SOMEONE TO ACQUIRE ALL 
OF THEM AND TO PAY CONSIDERATION TOR THEM, MEDICINE WOULD HAVE 
HAD NECESSARILY TO HAVE BEEN DIVESTED OF ANY OWNERSHIP. IT 
SAID "ALL," AND WE'RE NOT I'FRE QUIBBLING ABOUT WHETHER THEY 
SOLD 99 PERCENT OR JJOME . . ..RCCNTAGE LIU! THAT THAT, YOU 
I NOW, ARGUABLY MIGHT BE A BAD-FAITH ATTEMPT TO AVOID OPERATION 
OF THE CLAUSE. WE'RE NOWHERE NEAR THAT. 
MY CLIENTS CONTINUOUGLV HAVE RETAINED 50 
PERCENT OWNERSHIP IN THESE ASSETS ALL THE WA\ DOWN TO THE 
PRESENT DAY. IT'S A PLAIN MATTER OF FACT, YOUR HONOR, THAT 
6 
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CONSTRUING ALL THESE AGREEMENTS TOGETHER—AND I DON'T MIND IF 
THE COURT DID THAT, EVEN THOUGH EACH OF THE AGREEMENTS HAS—I 
CAN'T REMEMBER THE WORD FOR IT—BUT THE CLAUSE THAT SAYS THAT 
THAT'S A WHOLE AGREEMENT. 
EVEN IF YOU DO THAT, THE PLAIN AND SIMPLE FACT 
IS THAT MEDICINE HAS NEVER OWNED LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF ALL 
THIS, AND BECAUSE THE TERMINATION CLAUSE SPECIFICALLY STATES 
THAT THEY HAD TO SELL "ALL" OF IT IN ORDER FOR REHABILITATION 
TO HAVE THE RIGHTS TO AMY PERCENTAGE OF GOOD WILL, SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE. 
THEY SIMPLY HAVEN'T COME TORWARD WITH THE FACTS 
THEY'RE REQUIRED TO TO LET IT GO TO TRIAL AND DETERMINE IF THE 
EVENT OCCURRED. 
ON THAT BASIS, YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD AS1 THE 
COURT TO GRANT OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RULE THAT 
REHABILITATION, MS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT, HAS NOT PROVEN 
AND HAS NOT COME FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEIR 
CLAIM THAT "ALL" OF THIS EQUIPMENT HERE WAS SOLD. 
AND ON THIS POINT, ON PAGE FOUR OF THEIR 
MEMORANDUM AND OPPOSITION, IN PARAGRAPH 0, THEY ASSERT THAT 
THERE IS—THAT THE JMTEREST IN THIS PIE WAS CONVEYED OUT TO 
IHC. MEDICINE HAS RETAINED A CONTINUITY OF OWNERSHIP ALL 
THROUGH THIS. THAT WAS NOT WHAT WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE 
FARTIES. IT THE PLAINTIFF HAD WORRIED ABOUT A PARTIAL GALE, 
JT WAS UP TO THEM IN MAY OF '39 TO PUT WHATEVER PERCENTAGE IN 
7 
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THE CONTRACT CONCERNED THEM THAT WOULD GIVE RISE TO THEIR 
RIGHTS TO ANY GOOD WILL SHARE. 
FOR THAT REASON, WE WOULD ASK THE COURT TO 
GRANT OUR MOTION. I'LL ADDRESS THEIR MOTIONS. 
THE COURT: WHEN YOU SAY "ALL," WHAT DO YOU 
CONSIDER "ALL"? WHAT DO YOU SAY "ALL" INCLUDES? WHAT DOES 
"ALL" REFER TO? 
MR. MORRIS: "ALL" INCLUDES THE PARAGRAPH—. 
THE COURT: I'VE READ THAT. ANSWER MY 
QUESTION. 
MR. MORRIS: "ALL" INCLUDES THE LEASEHOLD 
INTEREST THEY HAD IN THE CENTER AT 39TH SOUTH; THE NAMED 
EQUIPMENT ASSETS THAT WERE LOCATED AT THE CENTER; PATIENTS; 
AND ALL THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE THAT WERE AT THE CENTER; AND 
IT WAS ALSO A REQUISITE THAT THE PURCHASER—. 
THE COURT: DID THEY SELL ALL OF THOSE? 
MR. MORRIS: THEY DID NOT. 
THE COURT: WHAT DIDN'T THEY SELL0 
MR. MORRIS: THEY DIDN'T SELL HALF OF THOSE 
THINGS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. GREEN: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, YOUR 
HONOR, I WILL USE THIS ILLUSTRATION HERE TO TALK ABOUT THE 
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. IT IS AGREED BY 
THE PARTIES THAT BOTH THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT HAD 
a 
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WORKED AT 39TH SOUTH IN SALT LAKE CITY AND HAD AN OPERATION. 
PRIOR TO MAY OF '89, THE PARTIES, BOTH PARTIES TALKED TO OTHER 
LARGER HOSPITAL OPERATIONS ABOUT A SALE OF THE CENTER, BUT 
PRIOR TO ANY SALE TAKING PLACE, THE DEFENDANTS HERE TERMINATED 
THE AGREEMENT OR TERMINATED THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT TO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT OF MAY OF '89. 
NOW AS COUNSEL INDICATED, THE PARAGRAPH IN THE 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE SALE OF ALL OF THE CENTER. 
NOW THIS IS THE CENTER, AND OF COURSE, YOU KNOW, INCLUDED IN 
THIS LIST OF ASSETS OF COURSE WOULD BE GOOD WILL. 
I THINK THAT IS UNCONTESTED, THAT AT LEAST AT 
THE POINT IN TIME OF MAY OF '89, EVERYONE—OR, THE PARTIES 
AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS VALUE IN THIS CENTER, 
AND VALUE IN THE GOOD WILL OF THAT CENTER, AND THAT MY 
CLIENTS, THE PLAINTIFFS, HAD UNDERTAKEN WORK TO DEVELOP THAT 
GOOD WILL. 
AND THEREFORE, IN THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT OF MAY 
OF '89—WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WAS WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANTS— 
PARAGRAPH 11 PROVIDED THAT IF THERE WAS A SALE, THAT MY 
CLIENTS WOULD BE ENTITLED TO ONE-THIRD OF THAT AMOUNT 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO GOOD WILL. 
ONE YEAR LATER, IN MAY OF '90, ALTHOUGH 
NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BEGAN PRIOR TO MAY OF '90, EVEN THOUGH 
NEGOTIATIONS WITH IHC BEGAN PRIOR TO MAY OF '89, THERE WAS A 
SERIES OF CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS AND 
9 
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IHC, AND ULTIMATELY IHC AND THE DEFENDANT HAD A JOINT VENTURE 
CALLED SPORTS MEDICINE WEST, I BELIEVE. 
ALL OF THESE DOCUMENTS WERE CONTEMPORANEOUSLY 
EXECUTED, SIGNED, FILED, NEGOTIATED, PRACTICALLY ALL AT THE 
SAME TIME IN MAY OF '90. 
AND THE FIRST CONTRACT THAT WAS ENTERED INTO 
WAS FOR THE SALE OF THE CENTER. 
OKAY, AGAIN WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE SAME ASSET 
OR SAME SUBJECT MATTER OF THE MAY, '89 AGREEMENT. 
OKAY. AS COUNSEL INDICATED, THIS FIRST 
CONTRACT PROVIDED FOR THE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF THE CENTER TO 
IHC. 
NOW AT THIS POINT IN TIME, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE 
BEEN DIVESTED ONE-HALF OF THEIR INTEREST IN THE CENTER, AND 
NOW IHC OWNS ONE-HALF. IHC OWNS ONE-HALF, THE DEFENDANTS OWN 
ONE-HALF. 
OKAY. NOW—AND THIS IS—I MEAN THIS IS AGAIN 
ALL PART OF ONE DESIGN, ONE SET OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND 
ULTIMATELY ONE GOAL. 
NOW IHC TAKES THEIR ONE-HALF AND THE DEFENDANT 
TAKES THEIR ONE-HALF, AND THEY BOTH CONTRIBUTE IT TO A JOINT 
VENTURE. SO IN ESSENCE, NOW, THESE ASSETS, ALL OF THESE 
ASSETS, THIS ENTIRE CENTER, COMES DOWN HERE, AND IT'S IN THE 
JOINT VENTURE. 
NOW I FEEL THAT-—I MEAN CONTRARY TO WHAT 
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COUNSEL IS SAYING, THE DEFENDANTS HAVE DIVESTED THEMSELVES OF 
THE ENTIRE CENTER. 
NOW THEY HAVE SOLD OFF ONE-HALF, AND THEY 
RECEIVED CONSIDERATION. THEY RECEIVED CASH, AND THIS IS IN 
THE DOCUMENTS. THEY CONTRIBUTED THE OTHER HALF TO THE JOINT 
VENTURE, AND THEY RECEIVED ONE-HALF OF AN INTEREST IN THE 
JOINT VENTURE; CONSIDERATION AGAIN. 
SO IN ESSENCE, THEY HAVE SOLD—OR, THEY HAVE AT 
LEAST DIVESTED THEMSELVES OF THE ENTIRE CENTER, AND THAT'S 
BASICALLY THE POSITION OF THE PLAINTIFF UP HERE. 
IN MAY OF 1989, CERTAINLY THE PARTIES INTENDED 
THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A SALE, THAT MY CLIENTS WOULD RECEIVE— 
AND WERE CERTAINLY ENTITLED TO—ONE-THIRD OF THE INTEREST OR 
ONE-THIRD OF THE VALUE OF THE GOOD WILL. 
CERTAINLY MY CLIENTS MAY HAVE BEEN GUILTY OF 
NOT INSISTING THAT THEY CONTRACT BE MORE ARTFULLY DRAFTED TO 
PROVIDE FOR CONTINGENCIES OF THIS NATURE, BUT AS I SAY, I MEAN 
AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE DEFENDANTS CONTROL THE SITUATION. 
THEY OWN THIS, AND THEY CONTROL IT, AND RATHER THAN SELL THE 
WHOLE PACKAGE OR CONTRIBUTE THE WHOLE PACKAGE DIRECTLY HERE, 
THEY GO—THEY CIRCUMVENT THAT BY GOING FIRST TO IHC WITH A 
HALF AND THEN THEY CONTRIBUTE A HALF. 
NOW WE HAVE CITED IN OUR MEMORANDUM A NUMBER OF 
CASES THAT ARE RIGHT ON POINT WHERE A TRANSACTION OF THIS 
NATURE TAKES PLACE. IN ORDER TO INTERPRET AND GIVE CREDENCE 
11 
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TO THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES UP HERE IN MAY, THE COURTS CAN 
LOOK AT THE ENTIRE TRANSACTION, ALL OF THESE VARIOUS 
DOCUMENTS, AS A SINGLE DOCUMENT. 
AND I THINK THAT IN THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, IF THE 
COURT WILL LOOK—AND I'M SURE THE COURT HAS ALL THESE 
DOCUMENTS, BEGINNING WITH THE TRANSACTION OR TRANSFER OF ONE-
HALF HERE, AND THEN YOU LOOK AT EVERYTHING ELSE, EVERYTHING 
HERE ENDS UP HERE, 100 PERCENT OF THE CENTER ENDS UP HERE. 
THE FACT THAT THEY RUN THIS END RUN BY SELLING 
HALF HERE I DON'T THINK MAKES IT. I THINK THAT THE COURT MUST 
INTERPRET THIS AS A SINGLE TRANSACTION, AND THAT WHAT ACTUALLY 
TOOK PLACE, BOTH FROM A LEGAL STAND POINT AND AN EQUITABLE 
STAND POINT, WAS A SALE AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE MAY, '89 
AGREEMENT. 
THE COURT: I WOULD ASK YOU THE SAME QUESTION: 
WHAT DO YOU THINK "ALL" INCLUDES? 
MR. GREEN: WELL, I THINK "ALL" INCLUDES 
EVERYTHING THAT IS INCLUDED IN THESE VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, AND WE 
HAVE—WE HAVE SHOWN, IN THE MEMORANDUM—I MEAN THERE'S A 
DOCUMENT THAT HANDLES GOOD WILL. THERE IS A DOCUMENT THAT 
TAKES CARE OF THE LEASE, THE NAMED EQUIPMENT, EVERYTHING IN 
THE CENTER. 
IT'S WHAT WAS OPERATING AT 39TH SOUTH IN SALT 
LAKE CITY, AND ALTHOUGH IT ENDED UP IN ANOTHER FACILITY—AND 
THE HOSPITAL LEASE—AT A POINT IN TIME, THIS ENTIRE PACKAGE 
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WAS OWNED BY THE JOINT VENTURE AND SIMPLY OPERATED BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
MR. MORRIS! TO RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFF'S 
ARGUMENT, YOUR HONOR, I NEED ONLY REFER YOU TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF 
THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT: 
"SALE" SHALL BE DEFINED AS A TRANSFER 
WHEREIN THE PURCHASER ACQUIRES AND PAYS 
CONSIDERING FOR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING... 
DID IHC ACQUIRE "ALL" OF THE FOLLOWING^ THE ANSWER IS NO. 
DID IHC PAY CONSIDERATION FOR "ALL" OF THE FOLLOWING^ THE 
ANSWER IS NO. 
AT THE BOTTOM OF PARAGRAPH 11, IT STATES—AND 
THIS IS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THEIR RIGHT TO 
GET GOOD WILL--IT SAYS: 
...AND WHEREBY THE PURCHASER ASSUMES 
COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE 
BUSINESS OF THE CENTER... 
SO THERE ARE THREE EVENTS THAT MUST HAVE OCCURRED FOR THEM TO 
WITHSTAND OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: IHC MUST HAVE 
ACQUIRED ALL THESE ASSETS. DID IHC ACQUIRE THEM'" NO. 
DID IHC PAY CONSIDERATION FOR ALL OF THEM^ NO. 
DID IHC ASSUME COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALL OF THE 
BUSINESS AT THE CENTERS THE ANSWER IS NO. 
YOUR HONOR, THERE IS MO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
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THOSE THREE ESSENTIAL FACTUAL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT ON THIS, 
AND THERE'S NO ARGUMENT ABOUT THE FACT THAT NOW MY CLIENT 
STILL OWNS 50 PERCENT OF THIS ORIGINAL PIE. 
IT'S NOW DOWN HERE. THEY OWN IT IN A DIFFERENT 
FORM, BUT THE FACT IS—AND MR. GREEN I THINK, INCIDENTALLY, I 
DON'T HE'S TRYING TO DO ANYTHING UNTOWARD HERE, BUT HE IS 
FOCUSING THE COURT'S ATTENTION ON WHAT HAPPENED IN TERMS OF 
THE DIVESTITURE HERE WHEN THE CONTRACT FOCUSES ON WHAT THE 
PURCHASER ACQUIRES. 
IF THIS PURCHASER—AND IT'S ONLY CONTEMPLATED 
THAT THERE BE ONE; THEY COULD HAVE TAKEN THIS AND THEY COULD 
HAVE SOLD IT A YEAR LATER OR SOMETHING, SOLD 10 PERCENT HERE, 
30 PERCENT AND SO FORTH—WHAT THIS AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY 
CONTEMPLATES IS ONE PURCHASER, ONE PURCHASE PRICE, AND 
COMPLETE ASSUMPTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THIS; IN 
OTHER WORDS, MEDICINE IS OUT, MY CLIENTS HAVE BEEN FULLY PAID, 
THEY DON'T HAVE ANY OWNERSHIP INTEREST, DON'T HAVE ANY 
OPERATIONAL INTEREST. 
THAT DID NOT OCCUR. YOUR HONOR, ALL THESE 
ASSETS WERE NOT SOLD, ALL THESE ASSETS WERE MOT PASSED TO IHC. 
IHC DID NOT ASSUME COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF "ALL." 
THE COURT: YOU DON'T THINK GOING TOGETHER IN 
THE JOINT VENTURE COMPLETED THAT AND THAT WAS JUST A WAY 
GETTING AROUND THE WORDS IN THE CONTRACT? 
MR. MORRIS: NO, BECAUSE YOUR HONOR, IHC NEVER 
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ASSUMED COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL. YOU HEARD MR. GREEN SAY 
HERE THAT MY CLIENT STILL HAS OPERATIONAL CONTROL, NO. 1. NO. 
2, WHAT DID IHC EVER PAY IN THE FORM OF CONSIDERATION FOR THIS 
HALF OF THE PIE? 
IT DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT MY CLIENTS NOT RECEIVE 
CONSIDERATION. I MEAN I SUPPOSE MR. GREEN ARGUES THAT THEY 
RECEIVED CONSIDERATION BECAUSE THEY CONTRIBUTED THIS TO THIS, 
AND THEY RECEIVED BACK A HALF INTEREST. 
BUT IT'S SIX OF ONE AND HALF DOZEN OF ANOTHER; 
THEY STILL OWN THIS HALF. THIS IS—IHC STILL HAS ITS INTEREST 
IN THAT HALF. IHC DID NOT PAY CONSIDERATION. IT REQUIRES 
THAT THE PURCHASER PAY CONSIDERATION, NOT THAT THEY—NOT THAT 
MEDICINE RECEIVE CONSIDERATION. 
AND IHC, PLAIN AND SIMPLE, HAS NEVER, EVER PAID 
ANY MONIES OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION FOR ANY PART OF THIS PIE 
OTHER THAN THE ONE-HALF OF IT. 
AND IT'S OUTSIDE THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE 
PARTIES, AND FOR THEM TO COME IN AND SAY NOW, "WE HAD THESE 
NEGOTIATIONS, THAT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING," THAT IS ALL PAROL, 
YOUR HONOR, AND IT'S PRECISELY WHY THIS DOCUMENT DEFINES WHAT 
A SALE IS SO SPECIFICALLY. 
THE COURT: YOU MAKE A BIG POINT IN YOUR 
MEMORANDUM THAT THIS IS NOT AMBIGUOUS, THEREFORE THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE RECEIVED; AND IF THIS COURT FEELS IT IS 
AMBIGUOUS, THEN PAROL EVIDENCE WOULD BE RECEIVED. 
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MR. MORRISs I AGREE WITH THAT. BUT I SUBMIT 
THAT "ALL" MEANS "ALL;" IT'S NOT AMBIGUOUS, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: AND THAT'S WHY I ASKED WHAT "ALL" 
MEANS. 
MR. MORRIS: WELL—. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. MORRIS: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: LET ME SUGGEST SOMETHING. THIS 
CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL. IT LOOKS LIKE IT REALLY HINGES ON THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONTRACT; IN OTHER WORDS, IT LOOKS LIKE 
A LEGAL QUESTION. 
AND YOU COME TO THE COURT, YOU COME AND PRESENT 
ALL KINDS OF EVIDENCE, AND YOU COULDN'T TELL ME ANYTHING MORE 
THAN WHAT I HAVE HEAR TODAY AND SAY WHAT YOU MEAN, AND I MIGHT 
MAKE A DECISION AND THEN LET YOU GO UP AND DECIDE WHAT IT IS. 
MR. GREEN: AND WE AGREE WITH THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. MORRIS: THAT'S OUR POSITION. IT'S NOT 
AMBIGUOUS SO YOU DON'T NEED ANY OTHER EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: LET ME INDICATE THIS TO YOU, MAYBE 
I'M THE ONE WHO'S OUT IN LEFT FIELD, BUT I'M THE ONE, AS I 
READ THIS CONTRACT, WHO HAD AS MY IMMEDIATE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE CONTRACT THAT IT WAS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT BOTH OF YOU ARE 
ARGUING. THAT'S WHAT CONCERNS ME. 
WHEN I READ THE TERM "ALL," THAT'S WHY I HAVE 
ASKED YOU: IT SAYS THAT THE SALE SHALL BE DEFINED AS THE 
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TRANSFER OF OR THE PURCHASER ACQUIRING AND PAYING 
CONSIDERATION FOR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING. THAT DOES NOT INCLUDE 
100 PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF THE FOLLOWING, BUT IT MUST INCLUDE 
IN THE SALE ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS, AND EACH ONE OF THOSE 
ITEMS WERE SOLD. THERE WAS NOT 100 PERCENT, BUT THERE WAS 50 
PERCENT; BUT ALL OF THOSE WERE SOLD. 
IT SAYS THAT THE SALE SHALL BE DEFINED AS A 
TRANSFER WHEN THE PURCHASER ACQUIRES AND PAYS CONSIDERATION 
FOR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING. AND TO ME, I DIDN'T EVEN THINK OF 
THIS "100 PERCENT;" IT WAS JUST THE SALE MUST INCLUDE ALL OF 
THE FOLLOWING. AND—. 
MR. GREEN: I AGREE WITH YOUR HONOR; THAT IT 
CAN BE INTERPRETED THAT WAY. 
THE COURT: BUT IT CONCERNS ME WHEN NEITHER ONE 
OF YOU LOOKED AT IT THAT WAY. THAT'S WHY I SAY THAT IT SURE 
APPEARS TO BE AMBIGUOUS TO ME. OF COURSE THE ARGUMENT HAS 
SOME MERIT THERE, BUT I THINK IT MAY BE ABSOLUTELY CORRECT AS 
FAR AS THE JOINT VENTURE JOINING, AND I'VE REVIEWED ALL OF 
THESE DOCUMENTS, BUT STILL THAT'S WHAT I'M LOOKING AT. I 
DON'T WANT TO REARGUE IT, BUT THAT'S WHY I WAS ASKING YOU THAT 
IF YOU FEEL. YOU WANT AN INTERPRETATION, THEN YOU CAN TAKE IT 
UP, BECAUSE IF THIS WAS BEING TRIED, AND THE SAME THING WAS 
BEING SAID HERE, THAT'S THE WAY I INTERPRET THIS CONTRACT. 
MR. MORRIS: I AGREE THAT IT WOULD SAVE 
EVERYONE TIME AND MONEY, YOUR HONOR, IF THIS COULD BE DISPOSED 
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OF AS A MATTER OF LAW, LOOKING SOLELY TO THE CONTRACT. I 
DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE FACTS, UNLESS 
THE COURT IS GOING TO ALLOW PAROL EVIDENCE. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WOULD ALLOW PAROL EVIDENCE, 
BECAUSE I THINK IT'S AMBIGUOUS. BUT I THINK PAROL EVIDENCE 
HAS BEEN INTRODUCED, AND OF COURSE YOU'VE OBJECTED TO IT, BUT 
I DON'T THINK PAROL EVIDENCE WAS THAT CONTROLLING. IT DIDN'T 
ADD ANYTHING TO THE WAY I HAVE INTERPRETED THIS CONTRACT. 
MR. GREEN: EVERYTHING IS BEFORE THE COURT AT 
THIS TIME, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE. 
MR. MORRIS: IT MAY BE HELPFUL, YOUR HONOR, IF 
WE WERE ALLOWED TEN DAYS OR SO TO BRIEF THAT LEGAL ARGUMENT 
ABOUT IT BEING AMBIGUOUS, UNLESS THE COURT HAS ALREADY MADE 
THAT DETERMINATION. I WOULD LIKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
DEMONSTRATE OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT, THAT IT'S NOT 
AMBIGUOUS, AND REALLY IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO BOTH OF THESE 
PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENTS, OR ARGUABLY PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS. 
MR. GREEN: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE MO PROBLEM WITH 
THAT. I'M ONLY POINTING OUT THAT I THINK OUR POSITION IN ALL 
OF THIS BEGAN WITH OUR—I MEAN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, WHEN 
WE MADE THE DEMAND AFTER THE SALE, THAT AT ALL TIMES WE WERE 
SAYING THAT, YOU KNOW, "ALL" WAS MOT SOLD. 
AND SO, YOU KNOW, WE SAID, "YES, IT WAS, UNDER 
WHAT OCCURRED." BUT I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH YOU, YOU KNOW—. 
THE COURT: AMD THAT'S FINE. DON'T RE-ARGUE 
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IT. OF COURSE, AS I SAY, I HATE TO—I DON'T WANT TO MAKE A 
DECISION JUST TO BE WRONG, WHEN I KNOW I'M WRONG, BUT THAT'S 
THE WAY I INTERPRET IT. 
AND AS I SAY, TO ME, THAT'S JUST WHAT HIT ME 
RIGHT OFF; I DIDN'T EVEN CONSIDER THE OTHER. THAT'S WHY I 
WISH ONE OF YOU WOULD HAVE PICKED THAT UP. 
MR. GREENs WE WILL ADOPT IT, YOUR HONOR. 
(LAUGHTER) 
THE COURT: AND THAT CONCERNS ME. OKAY. THEN 
I WON'T MAKE A RULING, AMD I'LL WAIT FOR FURTHER MATERIAL. 
MR. MORRIS: WOULD IT BE THE COURT'S ORDER THAT 
BY OCTOBER 6TH WE FILE SIMULTANEOUS BRIEFS ON AMBIGUITY OR 
NON-AMBIGUITY OF THE AGREEMENT? 
MR. GREEN: WE WOULD RATHER—I MEAN SINCE 
COUNSEL WANTS TO FILE AN ADDITIONAL BRIEF, I WOULD LIKE HIM TO 
FILE IT, AND THEM GIVE US SEVEN DAYS TO RESPOND. 
MR. MORRIS: THEN I WOULD HAVE TO REPLY. I 
WOULD PREFER THAT WE BOTH BRIEF IT AND SUBMIT IT TO THE COURT 
AT THE SAME TIME. 
THE COURT: WELL, I WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH 
THAT, BUT I GUESS THEY HAVE A RIGHT—THIS IS YOUR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT,, THEY WOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO RESPOND TO WHAT 
YOU HAVE TO SAY, SO J. GUESS UNDER THE RULES THAT YOU'LL HAVE 
TO FOLLOW THEM. 
MR. MORRIS: ALL RIGHT. 
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THE COURT: I HATE TO TAKE THAT LONG WITH IT, 
BECAUSE I'LL FORGET WHAT—. 
MR. GREEN: IT'S GETTING CLOSE TO TRIAL. 
THE COURT: BUT IT SOUNDS LIKE THAT AT THE 
TRIAL THERE'S GOING TO BE NOTHING MORE, OF COURSE, AND THEN 
THERE'S ISSUES AS FAR AS THE NON-COMPETITION CLAUSE. AND 
COUNSEL, WHEN YOU TELL ME AFTER THE CASE IS TWO YEARS OLD THAT 
YOU HAVEN'T EVEN LOOKED INTO THAT MATTER, I'M NOT PERSUADED BY 
THAT. THAT'S NOT A VALID MOTION AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED. 
MR. MORRIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE 
COUNTERCLAIMS HAVE ONLY BEEN ON FILE SINCE MAY. 
THE COURT: THAT'S YOUR FAULT. IT'S STILL TWO 
YEARS OLD, THIS CASE IS. AND SO I DON'T—I DON'T BUY THAT. 
OF COURSE YOU SAY ALL THE INFORMATION WAS WITH THE DEFENDANTS, 
AND THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FILE AFFIDAVITS SAYING THEY HAVEN'T 
EVER COMPETED OTHER THAN MAYBE THE PATIENTS THAT THE DOCTOR 
SAID COULD GO IN UNDER THAT LETTER. WELL, ANYWAY, I WANT TO 
DISPOSE OF THE WHOLE THING, AND I'M SAYING THAT IF YOU DON'T 
HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ON THAT, SAY IT, BECAUSE—. 
MR. MORRIS: I'M EXPECTING THE DISCOVERY 
ANSWERS THAT WERE DUE YESTERDAY. 
THE COURT: YOU'LL HAVE THOSE IN, AND THEN 
ARGUE THAT TO ME, TOO. THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 





STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT 
THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET 
FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 20, 
BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
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(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
IN OPEN COURT:) 
THE COURT: SALT_LAKE_KNEE_ANp_SPORTS_VERSUS 
§ALJ_LAKE_CITY_KNEE_AND_SPORTS. COUNSEL? 
MR. MORRIS: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, MARK 
MORRIS. 
THE COURT: COUNSEL, I DON'T WANT YOU TO REPEAT 
ALL YOU SAID THE OTHER DAY. I'VE READ ALL THE MEMORANDA AND 
I'M FAMILIAR WITH IT. SO DON'T GO BACK OVER EVERYTHING YOU 
SAID THE OTHER DAY. 
MR. MORRIS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. ALL THAT 
WE ASK THE COURT TO DETERMINE HERE ARE TWO THINGS. ONE IS: 
WHAT DOES THE PARAGRAPH AT ISSUE MEAN? AND: HAS THE 
PLAINTIFF COME FORWARD IN OPPOSITION TO OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WITH RECORD EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS 
OF HIS CLAIMS? 
AMD AGAIN, THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT 
AS WE CONTEND IT MEANS IS THAT THEY HAVE—THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
NOT COME FORWARD WITH RECORD EVIDENCE OF WHAT THE CONTRACT 
MEANS. 
BRIEFLY, THE CONTRACT REQUIRES THAT MY CLIENTS 
SELL "ALL" OF THE CENTER, THAT A PURCHASER ACQUIRE ALL AND PAY 
CONSIDERATION FOR ALL OF THE CENTER THAT USED TO BE JOINTLY 
OWNED BY THESE PARTIES. 
NOW BEFORE, YOUR HONOR—AND THE PLAINTIFF AND 
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MY CLIENT, THE PLAINTIFF AND MY CLIENTS USED TO OWN JOINTLY 
THIS CENTER. THEY TERMINATED THEIR RELATIONSHIP. THERE WAS A 
SALE BETWEEN THE PARTIES OF ALL THE ASSETS. THE ONLY THING 
THAT WAS LEFT OUT WAS GOOD WILL, AND THE ONLY THING THE 
PLAINTIFF IS ASKING HERE FOR IS FOR A PERCENTAGE OF THE 
PURCHASE PRICE, ASSUMING THERE WAS A PURCHASE, THAT WAS 
DEVOTED TO GOOD WILL. 
SO THAT IF MY CLIENTS EVER SOLD ALL OF THE 
CENTER THAT THEY NOW OWN ALL OF, AFTER THEY BOUGHT OUT THE 
PLAINTIFF, IF THEY EVER SOLD ALL OF IT, AND IF THAT PURCHASER 
ASSUMED COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE CENTER, THEN MY 
CLIENT WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO PAY TO THE PLAINTIFF A PERCENTAGE 
OF WHATEVER PRICE IN THAT PURCHASE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO GOOD WILL 
IN THE CENTER. 
IT'S UNDISPUTED THAT MY CLIENTS SOLD A HALF TO 
IHC; NOT ALL, BUT A HALF, ONE-HALF INTEREST IN ALL. 
UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THIS AGREEMENT, WITH 
A SALE OF THE CENTER BEING DEFINED AS A TRANSFER OF ALL OF THE 
CENTER TO ONE PURCHASER, AND WHERE THAT ONE PURCHASER ASSUMES 
COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL, A SALE OF HALF, LIKE WE HAD 
HERE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE, SIMPLY DOES NOT MEET THE ELEMENTS 
OF THE PARAGRAPH. 
IT WAS NOT THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES AS 
EXPRESSED UNAMBIGUOUSLY IN THAT CONTRACT THAT A SALE OF A HALF 
OF THE ASSETS WOULD ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO ANY INTEREST IN 
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1 THE GOOD WILL REMAINING. 
2 FOR THOSE REASONS, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE THIS 
3 RECORD, AS IT STANDS TODAY, DOES NOT CONTAIN EVIDENCE THAT MY 
4 CLIENTS SOLD ALL OF THE CENTER TO A PURCHASER, AND BECAUSE OF 
5 NO EVIDENCE THAT THAT PURCHASER ASSUMED COMPLETE OPERATIONAL 
6 CONTROL OF THE CENTER, WE AS> THE COURT TO DISMISS THE 
7 PLAINTIFF'S COUNTERCLAIM OR THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST MY 
8 CLIENTS AND DISMISS THE COMPLAINT. 
9 THE COURT IS ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH THE 
10 ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES. I THINI- THE COURT SHOULD ALSO TAI-E 
11 NOTE OF THE FACT IN OPPOSITION TO OUR SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES 
12 THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT COME FORWARD WITH ONE DICTIONARY OR ONE 
13 CASE FROM ANY JURISDICTION, INCLUDING UTAH, THAT SAYS THAT 
14 "ALL," THAT THE MEANING OF THE WORD "ALL" WOULD BE PERMITTED 
15 TO HAVE SOMETHING LESS THAN A HUNDRED PERCENT. 
16 AND SO FOR THAT REASON, YOUR HONOR, WE AS1- THE 
17 COURT TO DISMISS THE CLAIMS AGAINST MY CLIENT. I SHOULD ALSO 
10 ADVISE THE COURT THAT MY CLIENTS HAVE ALLEGED IN THE 
19 COUNTERCLAIM IN THIS ACTION THAT THERE IS A PENDING MOTION FOR 
20 SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COUNTERCLAIM, ALTHOUGH, YOUR HONOR, I 
21 THINF IT'S UNDISPUTED THAT THE DEFENDANT--OR, THAT THE 
22 PLAINTIFF DID CONTINUE TREATING TATIENTS AFTER THEIR 
23 RELATIONSHIP TERMINATED. 
24 THE DAMAGES ISSUE INVOLVED IN THAT COUNTERCLAIM 
25 J3 CO— WELL, DIFFICULT, FOR LACI OF A BETTER WORD, WE WOULD 
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HAVE TO BRING IN EVERY PATIENT, FIND OUT HOW MUCH MONEY THEY 
PAID, THAT MR. GREEN AND I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS PRELIMINARILY, 
BUT AT THIS POINT MY CLIENTS ARE WILLING TO DISMISS THEIR 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS SO THAT WE CAN GET THESE 
ISSUES REFINED AND HOPEFULLY GET THE WHOLE MATTER TAKEN CARE 
OF TODAY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. 
MR. GREEN: YOUR HONOR, I WILL BE BRIEF. AND 
AS WE HAVE INDICATED ALL ALONG, AND CITED IN OUR MEMORANDUM, 
THE SITUATION IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE MUST BE LOOKED AT IN 
TERMS OF A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN, YOU KNOW, THE 
VERY NARROW INTERPRETATION THAT COUNSEL WOULD HAVE THE COURT 
MAKE. 
WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN OUR MEMORANDUM THAT ON 
OR ABOUT MAY 24, 1990, THERE WERE NO LESS THAN 18 DOCUMENTS 
EXECUTED BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS AND IHC, AND THE CASE LAW THAT 
IS POINTED OUT IN THE MEMORANDUM INDICATES THAT, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THESE DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER. 
AND WHEN YOU DO SO, SPORTS MEDICINE WEST, WHICH 
WAS THE ENTITY THAT REMAINED AFTER THESE 18 DOCUMENTS WERE 
EXECUTED, OWNED 100 PERCENT OF ALL OF THOSE ASSETS THAT WERE 
THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE TERMINATION AGREEMENTS OR SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE SUBJECT CONTRACT HERE. 
AGAIN, THE DEFENDANTS WOULD HAVE YOU—WOULD 
ARGUE FROM A VERY NARROW STAND POINT, THAT THE COURT SHOULD 
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LOOI- AT ONE DOCUMENT AND INDICATE THAT—AND DETERMINE THAT ALL 
OF THE ASSETS WERE IN FACT OR HAD TO BE SOLD, AND YET WERE 
NOT. 
AT THE LAST HEARING, THE COURT SUGGESTED THAT 
IT WAS CLEAR TO THE COURT THAT THE LANGUAGE AT ISSUE MEANT 
SOME PORTION OF ALL ITEMS LISTED IN THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT; 
THAT, YOU hNOW, A PORTION OF ALL OF THOSE ITEMS HAD TO BE SOLD 
IN ORDER FOR THE CONDITION PRECEDENT TO BE MET. 
THE DEFENDANTS ARGUE THAT THE PLAINTIFFS NOW 
CANNOT ADOPT THE COURT'S ARGUMENT, AND YET THEY OFFER NO LEGAL 
AUTHORITY WHY THE COURT CAN'T SIMPLY MAI-E THAT DETERMINATION. 
THE COURT WE BELIEVE IS FREE, OF COURSE, TO 
MAI-E ITS DECISION UN ANY BASIS. WE WOULD SIMPLY POINT OUT, 
ONCE AGAIN, THAT UNDER THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION, THERE ARE 
NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT, AND THE PLAINTIFF WOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
AND AGAIN, UNDER THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY, THE 
COURT MUST LOOI AT ALL OF THE DOCUMENTS, AND WHEN YOU LOOI- AT 
ALL THE DOCUMENTS, THEN A SALE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 
AGREEMENT DID IN FACT TAI-E PLACE. 
THEY CERTAINLY—AND IT S UNDISPUTED---THAT THE 
LEASE WAS SOLD, THE NAME WAS SOLD, THE EQUIPMENT WAS SOLD, THE 
PATIENTS AND RECEIVABLES WERE SOLD, AND THE GOOD WILL WAS 
SOLD. 
THERE WAS A QUESTION RAISED I BELIEVE IN THE 
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LATEST DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE DEFENDANT THAT, YOU I NOW, THAT 
SPORTS MEDICINE, THE ENTITY THAT WAS THE FINAL ENTITY OR THE 
JOINT VENTURE AS IT WERE, HAD NOT ASSUMED CONTROL OF THE 3900 
SOUTH CENTER. 
YOU >NOW, THAT IS NOT THE CASE. THE DEFENDANTS 
ACTUALLY CONTRACTED WITH SPORTS MEDICINE WEST UNDER A 
MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT AND ASSUMED CONTROL OF 3900 IN THE 
INTERIM. 
SO AGAIN, ALL OF THESE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
HAVE BEEN MET. I MEAN THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE DEFENDANT 
SOLD, YOU HMOW, AS THEY INDICATED, ONE-HALF OF THE ASSETS TO 
IHC FOR A NUMBER OF DOLLARS. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. 
THE DEFENDANTS THEN CONTRIBUTED THE OTHER HALF 
OF WHAT THEY OWNED TO SPORTS MEDICINE WEST, AND WHAT THEY 
RECEIVED BACI- WAS AN INTEREST IN THE JOINT VENTURE. 
IN OTHFR WORDS, YOU f NOW, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY 
HAVE SOLD HALF TO IHC AND CONTRIBUTED THE OTHER HALF TO SPORTS 
MEDICINE, IT rtLL ENDED UP BEING OWNED BY SPORTS MEDICINE. 
THEY WERE PAID WITH DOLLARS, PAID WITH AN INTEREST IN THE 
JOINT VENTURE, THEY HAVE NO MORE INTEREST IN THE CENTER, THE 
CENTER IS DONE. MY CLIENTS COULDN'T, UNDER AMY OTHER 
SITUATION, BE COMPENSATED FOR THEIR INTEREST IN THE CENTER, 
AND I BELIEVE THAT UNDER THIS PARTICULAR SCENARIO, MY CLIENTS 
ARE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
MR. MORRIS: YOUR HONOR—. 
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THE COURT: I'M READY TO RULE, COUNSEL. AS I 
SAY, I HAVE GONE OVER THIS QUITE IN DETAIL AND DISCUSSED IT 
WITH YOU BEFORE. I'M NOT PERSUADED BY MR. GREEN'S ARGUMENT AS 
FAR AS A JOINT VENTURE IS CONCERNED. 
I JUST DON'T THINK IT'S THE SAME AS WAS 
INTENDED UNDER THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT, PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
THE NEXT THING I LOOKED AT WAS, OF COURSE, THE 
ARGUMENT OF MR. MORRIS WHERE HE ARGUES AS FAR AS "ALL" OF THE 
EQUIPMENT, AND IT'S A PLAUSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF IT. 
AS I INDICATED TO YOU, AS I READ IT, WHEN I 
READ THAT, I READ IT AS "ALL OF THE FOLLOWING PARTS OF IT MUST 
BE INCLUDED; AND AT THE TIME I READ IT, AND OF COURSE NOW IT'S 
BEEN ARGUED BEFORE THE COURT—WHICH I NOTED—THAT THE DRAFTER 
OF THE AGREEMENT FIRST SAID "ALL OF THE FOLLOWING" AND THEN IN 
THE FOLLOWING HE PUT TWO OTHER PHRASES WHICH INCLUDED "ALL," 
WHERE HE SAYS, "ALL EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ASSETS," AND, 
"COMPLETE OPERATIONAL CONTROL." 
SO MY INTERPRETATION OF THE WAY I READ THAT IS 
THAT THE SALE MUST INCLUDE ALL OF THE FOLLOWING, ALL OF THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS. AND FROM THOSE ITEMS, IT MUST BE ALL OF THE 
EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ASSETS, AND THEY MUST HAVE COMPLETE 
OPERATION CONTROL. 
THAT DID MOT TAKE PLACE UNDER MY 
INTERPRETATION, READING OF IT, NOR DID IT TAKE PLACE UNDER THE 
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DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF IT, OR EVEN THE PLAINTIFF'S, 
EXCEPT THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUE AS FAR AS JOINT VENTURE, THAT 
SITUATION IS CONCERNED. 
THEREFORE I FEEL THAT THE MOTION BY THE 
DEFENDANTS IS WELL TAKEN. I WOULD GRANT THEIR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND IT SOUNDS LIKE I DON'T HAVE TO RULE NOW 
ON THE OTHER MOTIONS THAT YOU STIPULATED TO. 
WITH THAT STIPULATION, THEN, I WILL NOT GIVE MY 
RULING. BUT IF THE STIPULATION WERE NOT THERE, I WOULD BE 
READY TO RULE CONCERNING THAT, TOO. 
MR. MORRIS: I THINK, YOUR HONOR, WE HAD A 
TRIAL DATE SET FOR THE 29TH. IN LIGHT OF BOTH ACTIONS 
EFFECTIVELY BEING DISMISSED, I THINK THAT CAN BE VACATED, AND 
I'LL BE GLAD TO PREPARE THE STIPULATION AS TO THE DISMISSAL OF 
THE COUNTERCLAIM AND THE ORDER ON THE COURT'S RULING. 
THE COURT: IF YOU WOULD PREPARE IT, COUNSEL. 
MR. MORRIS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 





STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT 
THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET 
FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 10, 
BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
1ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 1993, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 




8 1 7 4 / 3 - 3 3 
FILM WSTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DTfflfiKJkftTclal OlitrlCt 
IN AND FOR SALT LM E COUNTY, STATE OF t-JTAH^.w 10 1M4 
SALT LAI- E ^ NEE V SPORTS : R E P O R T E R ^ ^ I J A N S C B I L T - O ^ 
REHABILITATION, INC, Fl-A HEARINe_ON_PLAINIIFFlS 
PROFESSIONAL THERAPY, I N C . , : MQIIQN_FQR_REC0NS1DERATION 
PLAINTIFF, : 
VS. : 
SALT LAKE CITY ^ NEE t> SPORTS : A n l ^ l M A I 
MEDICINE, A UTAH GENERAL UKIUIIMAL 
PARTNERSHIP, AND LONNIE E. : 
PAULOS, M.D., P.C., A UTAH 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, AND : 
THOMAS D. ROSENBERG, M.D., 
P.C., A UTAH PROFESSIONAL : *\\ 0*\o b^lb 
CORF'ORATIUM, GENERAL PARTNERS, lV fX 
CIVIL NO. LyiVUb..lftrCN 
DEFENDANTS. : HON. HOMER F. WILI- INSON 
BE ]T REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 2BTH_DAY_0F 
•-16Ny^ BYj._i22fl - CONTINUING IN THE R>:<X> A.M. LAW HND MOTION 
CALENDAR, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME UN FOR HEARING IN 
COURTROOM NO. D02 OF THE COURTS BUILDING, METROPOLITAN HALL OF 
JUSTICE, 24u EAST 4<>0 SOUTH, bALT LAI- F CITY, UTAH, BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILI- IMEON, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, STATE uF UTAH. 
APPEARANCES 
JQHN^C^GREEM^AJTQP^ GREEN I LUHN, 
722 BOSTON BUILDING, NO. * EXCHANGE PLACE, SALT LAI E CITY, 
UTAH H413 1 TELEPHONE LCI-7444 APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE 
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1 PLAINTIFF. 
2 M£3!<_Qi_!!!0RRI§j._AIIQRNIYr:AI-l.AW, SNELL & 
3 WILMER, Hi EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 900, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
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(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD 
IN OPEN COURT:) 
THE COURTs THE NEXT MATTER IS SALT LAKE KNEE 
AND SPORTS. COUNSEL, I DON'T \ NOW, MAYBE I COULD CUT THROUGH 
THIS. I'VE REVIEWED YOUR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND 
HERE'S THE POSITION THIS COURT TAhES. AND I'VE REVIEWED MY 
VIEW OF THE CASE, WHICH I EXPRESSED, AND I'M STILL OF THE SAME 
OPINION: THAT WHEN I DID THAT THE FIRST TIME, AND AS I READ 
THAT AGREEMENT, I STILL INTERPRET IT THE SAME WAY. 
AND THAT'S WHY 1 GAVE BOTH COUNSEL AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS IT, AND NEITHER PARTY REALLY CAME BACf 
SAY]NG ANYTHING AS FAR AS THE POSITION THAT I TOO* OR ANY CASE 
LAW OR ANYTHING PERTAINING TO IT. 
AS FAR AS THE PLAINTIFF IS CONCERNED, THERE'S 
JUST NOTHING IN THERE AT ALL, AND THE LOURT DID, AT THE TIME I 
INDICATED THAI , 1 INDH.ATED THERE WAS SOMETHING IN MY M]ND, 
rtND THE DEFENSE DID OF COURSE COME UP WITH THAT POINT. 
AND OF COURSE THAT IS A SITUATION WHERE 1 SAY 
IT JNCLUDES ALL OF THE FOLLOWING, AND MOT 1<X> PERCENT OF IT. 
HUT YOU'LL NOTICE ONE OF THEM DOEb SAY, OR USE THE TERM, "ALL" 
AGAIN, "ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT AMD OTHER ASSETS LOCATED IN THE 
CENTER," AND THAT DOES MAUI ALL OF THEM. 
AND WHERE THERE WAS NO CASE LAW GIVEN TO ME, 
EITHER WAY, AMD THEY HAVE THAT PROVISION ]N THERE, THAT'S 
WHERE 1 TOO!- MY—HUNG nY HAT AND WHERE I MADE MY DECISION. 
C0500 
b. AND I DID NOT EVER TA^  E THE POSITION THAT I WAS 
2 PERSUADED THAT THE JOINT VENTURE WAS SOMETHING THAT I WAS 
3 CONVINCED OF. I MAY HAVE SAID SOMETHING THAT IT MAY BE 
4 SOMETHING, AND YOU LAN ELABORATE ON IT, BUT I WAS NEVER 
5 PERSUADED ON THE JOINT VENTURE, AND I NEVER SAID THAT. 
6 NOW I DON'T ^ NOW HOW MUCH MORE YOU WANT TO—. 
7 MR. GREEN: WELL, THE ONLY THING THAT 1 WOULD 
Q INDICATE, THEN YOUR HONOR, IS THAT, YOU \ NOW, REGARDLESS OF 
9 VOUR INTERPRETATION, VOUR INTERPRETATION IS AT LEAST DIFFERENT 
10 THAN WHAT THE DEFENDANTS'—OR, HOW THE DEFENDANTS INTERPRETED 
1 1 IT. 
12 THE COURT: I \ NOW IT. 
13 MR. GREEN: WHAT WE WERE SAYING--. 
14 THE COURT: IT'S DIFFERENT THAN WHAT YOU 
15 INTERPRETED IT, TOG, AND I MAY BE COMPLETELY WRONG. 
J 6 MR. GREEN: BUT WE BELIEVE THAT, ON THAT BASIS, 
17 THERE IS AT LEAST AM AMBIbUlTV IN THE CONTRACT. THE CONTRACT 
18 WAS DRAFTED; I MEAN YOU REFER TO A DRAFTER, THE DRAFTER S 
j? INTENT, /OU HMOW, rtlMD AT LEAST IN THE DRAFTING OF THE 
20 DOCUMENT, IT WrtS UNDERTAh EN „ YOU ^ NOW, BY THE DEFENDANT IN 
21 THIS PARTLCULAR IMSTAMLE, rtND IF THERE'S AN uMBlGUm, IT 
22 SHOULD rtT LEAST BE JNTLRPRETED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
23 BUT AT THE '>ERV LEAST, THE PLAINTIFF, IF 
24 THEV'RE— 1 MEAN SINCE WlZ 1 EE THREE. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS 
25 OF THE LANGUHGE, IT WOULD SUGGEST AN HMBIUUITY, AND IT WOULD 
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FURTHER SUGGEST THAT MY CLIENT COULD BE ENTITLED TO PUT ON 
PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES AT THE TIME THE 
CONTRACT WAS ENTERED INTO. 
THE COURT: YOU DIDN'T HEAR WHAT I WENT ON TO 
SAY, THOUGH, COUNSEL. I SAID THAT IN IT, AT THE TIMF I GAVE 
MY INTERPRETATION, I NOTED IT, AND ALSO COUNSEL NOTED IT IN 
THEIR ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO IT, OF WHERE IT SAYS, "ALL OF 
THE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ASSETS," AND ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT AND 
OTHER ASSETS WERE MOT GOLD. 
SEE IT USES THAT WORD "ALL" TWICE; "ALL OF THE 
FOLLOWING," THEN, "ALL OF THOSE PARTICULAR ITEMS." 
MR. GREEN! I UNDERSTAND. I'M JUST SIMPLY 
SAYING THAT THAT WOULD SUGGEST AN AMBIGUITY. I MEAN WE DON'T 
^ NOW; I MEAN UNDER—JUST FOR A MOMENT, IF YOU'LL BEAR WITH ME, 
IF YOUR INTERPRETATION IS TO BE THE RULE, THEN YOU'RE SAYING 
IH ESSENCE THAT THE ]NTENT UF THE PARTIES WAS IHAT ONLY UNDER 
ONE SCENARIO WOULD THE/ EVER BE ENTITLED TO, YOU I- NOW, MONEY 
FROM THE GOOD WILL. THERE'S ONLY ONE SCENARIO. 
AND THAI IS IF AT LEAST A PORTION OF ALL THE 
ASSETS WERE SOLO
 MND ALL THE EQUIPMENT WERE SOLD, OR OTHER— 
EVERY OTHER SCENARIO, EVERY OTHER TYF'E OF SALE SUCH AS WE—YOU 
rNOW, WE HAVE BEFORE THE COURT, THAT WOULD PROHIBIT MY CLIENTS 
FROM SECURING I HE MOML / THAT THEY PE ENTITLED TO ON THEIR GOOD 
WILL. 
AND WHAT I M SAYING 13 1 DON'T THINi- THAT UNDER 
5 
ANY SCENARIO WOULD MY CLIENTS HAVE INTENDED TO ALSO PUT, YOU 
KNOW, CONTROL OF THIS PARTICULAR SITUATION IN THE HANDS OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
I MEAN ULTIMATELY ALL OF THE ASSETS WERE AT 
LEAST TRANSFERRED TO A THIRD ENTITY, AND THEN UNDER THIS 
SCENARIO MY CLIENTS ARE PROHIBITED FROM SECURING WHAT IS 
RIGHTFULLY THEIRS, AMD THAT'S WHY I MEAN THE INTENT—I MEAN 
THE AMBIGUITY IS STILL THERE. 
THE COURT: OF COURSE YOU'RE ARGUING THAT 
THEY'RE PRECLUDED, AND THAT MIGHT BE. BUT UNDER EITHER 
INTERPRETATION, UNDER THE PLAINTIFF'S INTERPRETATION WHERE 100 
PERCENT MUST BE, OR THE INTERPRETATION I PUT ON IT, WHERE 
"ALL" OF THEM MUST BE BOLD WITH "ALL" OF THE ASSETS, EITHER 
ONE OF THOSE INTERPRETATIONS THE PLAINTIFF IS OUT, BECAUSE I 
UNDERSTAND THAT THERE'S NOTHING, MO FURTHER EVIDENCE OR 
DISCOVERY THAT CAN BE BROUGHT FORTH TO SHOW ANYTHING DIFFERENT 
ON THAT. 
MR. GREEN: OTHER THAN THE INTENT OF THE 
PARTIES. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, 
WHEN YOU HAVE A WRITTEN CONTRACT, I DON'T THINK THE CONTRACT 
IS AMBIGUOUS AS FAR AS THAT EXTENT IS CONCERNED, ON EITHER ONE 
OF THOSE. IT'S A CLEAR CONTRACT. 
MR. GREEN: THEN, YOU KNOW, WHAT MY CLIENTS 
THEN ARE STUCK WITH IS SIMPLY A BAD CONTRACT. 
6 
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THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. THAT'S RIGHT. I 
DON'T KNOW HOW THEY READ IT WHEN THEY ENTERED INTO IT, BUT 
THEY ENTERED INTO THE CONTRACT, AND I THINK THEY'RE BOUND BY 
IT. 
MR. GREEN! I WOULD SUBMIT IT ON THAT BASIS, 
YOUR HONOR, IF THAT'S—. 
THE COURT: BASED ON THAT, I WOULD NOT BE 
INCLINED TO—I MEAN I WOULD RECONSIDER IT, BUT I WOULD STILL 
RULE IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENSE. 
MR. GREEN: I UNDERSTAND. 
MR. MORRIS: I'LL PREPARE THE ORDER, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 





STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, ED MIDGLEY, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT 
THE ABOVE AND FOREGOIMB PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME 
STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET 
FORTH; THAT SAID REPORT WAS, BY ME, SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED TO BE 
REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 7, 
BOTH INCLUSIVE; THAT SAID REPORT SO TRANSCRIBED CONSTITUTES A 
TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE 
ADDUCED AND PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND THIS 
K>I±! DAY OF MAY, 1994, AT SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
ED MIDGLEY-, RPR, CM ( 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
(UTAH CSR NO. 133) 
8 
C0505 
